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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade1 (GATT or General
Agreement) is recognized as "'the most important agreement regulating
trade among nations.' "2 It is intended to facilitate the development of
world resources; raise standards of living; increase real income; and ex-
pand the production and exchange of goods. 3 To achieve these objec-
tives, GATT is directed at "the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce."' 4 GATT has been surprisingly successful. De-
spite a tumultuous beginning 5 and endemic structural frailties, 6 GATT
"has arguably done more over the past 40 years to promote the cause of
peace and prosperity than any other international body."'7
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in IV Basic Instruments and Selected Docu-
ments 3 (1969) [hereinafter BISD].
2 Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the An-
tidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other
'Nonmarket Economy' Nations, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79, 83 n.23 (1987) (quoting Jackson, The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in 1 A Lawyer's Guide to International Business
Transactions 41 (W. Surrey & D. Wallace 2d ed. 1977)); see also J. Jackson, The World Trad-
ing System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 27 (1989) [hereinafter J.
Jackson, World Trading System] (GATT most important treaty governing international trade
relations); A. Lowenfeld, Public Controls on International Trade 22 (2d ed. 1983) (GATT
most important worldwide agency devoted to regulation of international commerce); Note,
Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and the International Trade
Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 79, 87 (1990) (GATT only internationally recognized regime for
trade regulation); cf. J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 3 (1969) [hereinafter J.
Jackson, World Trade] (little doubt GATr has contributed to purpose of establishing im-
proved international trade order).
3 See GATT, supra note 1, preamble.
4 Id.; see J. Jackson & W. Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations:
Cases, Materials, and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational
Economic Relations 8 (2d ed. 1986).
5 See text accompanying notes 25-34 infra.
6 See J. Jackson, Restructuring the GATr System 45-47 (1990) (summarizing institu-
tional problems in GATI).
7 Address by Clayton Yeutter before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2 (Sept. 10, 1986)
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One of the barriers to free trade that GATT seeks to eliminate is the
"dumping" of merchandise by one country into another country's mar-
ket. Stated generally, dumping is the sale of products in a foreign market
at a price less than "the normal value of the products" in the home mar-
ket. 8 This prohibition is predicated on the assumption that dumping is
not based on superior efficiency but is an attempt to injure or destroy
competition. 9 GATT permits a country to respond to dumping that
causes or threatens material injury to domestic industries by levying a
duty on the product "not greater in amount than the margin of dumping
in respect of such product."10 To illustrate, if a foreign company sells its
product for $1000 in the United States and for $1200 in its home market,
and if an American industry is injured materially by this practice, the
United States may respond by assessing a $200 duty," representing the
margin of dumping, on all future imports of the dumped product. Such
an "antidumping duty" is the internationally accepted response to
counteract "injurious dumping."12
Despite its other successes,13 GATT has been criticized as being
anything but successful in the antidumping arena.14 In particular, indus-
tries in the United States argue that GATT has failed to control dumping
effectively and that alternative forms of relief are needed to counteract
this unfair trade practice.' 5 The root of their concerns is the prospective
[hereinafter Yeutter], reprinted in Law and Practice under the GATT, III.C.1. at 2 (K. Sim-
monds & B. Hill eds. 1976 & Supp. 1988); see also The Times (London), Feb. 8, 1991, at 21
(International Chamber of Commerce stating that GATT "has powered 'the greatest expan-
sion of global living standards in the history of [hu]mankind' ").
8 GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. l(a); J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note
2, at 221. Where no comparable home market price exists, GATT allows the use of produc-
tion costs in the country of origin or market prices in comparable countries to determine
whether dumping has occurred. See GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. l(b). For a more
detailed discussion of the proper definition of dumping, see I. Viner, Dumping: A Problem in
International Trade 1-22 (1966).
9 For a detailed discussion of why a foreign company would want to dump, see text ac-
companying notes 70-74 infra.
10 GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 2.
11 However, allowance for differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, and other
factors affecting comparability also must be made. See id. paras. 1-7.
12 See Remedies Against Dumping of Imports: Hearing on S. 1655 Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1986) [hereinafter
1986 Hearing] (testimony of Noel Hemmendinger, Counsel, Willkie Farr & Gallagher). "Inju-
rious dumping" refers to dumping that results in material injury to a domestic industry. Only
when dumping results in such an injury is the imposition of a duty permissible. See text ac-
companying notes 92-95, 100-08 infra.
13 Specifically, GATT has been instrumental in lowering tariffs, reducing trade barriers,
and expanding trade such that global living standards have increased markedly. See Yeutter,
supra note 7, at 2; The Times (London), supra note 7, at 21.
14 See notes 127-29 and accompanying text infra.
Is See text accompanying notes 130-43 infra. Sensing such dissatisfaction, Rep. Richard
Gephardt made trade the key issue in his 1988 presidential campaign. See N.Y. Times, Apr.
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nature of the existing remedy. 16 Since antidumping duties are assessed
only after a violation has been detected,17 dumping is essentially a risk-
free, no-lose proposition,1 8 giving foreign exporters a free "first bite at the
apple." 19 The absence of monetary damages for injuries sustained as a
result of dumping compounds manufacturers' difficulties. 20
In response to the growing sentiment that American trade laws do
not reflect the realities of international commerce, Congress has intro-
duced several initiatives seeking to strengthen these laws to combat un-
fair trade practices more effectively. One specific proposal, which has
received a flood of congressional interest 21 but little scholarly attention, 22
23, 1987, at A26.
16 See text accompanying notes 130-38 infra.
17 See text accompanying notes 131-36 infra.
18 See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 65 (testimony of William H. Knoell, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Cyclops Corp.); id. at 58 (testimony of Barton C. Green, General
Counsel and Secretary, American Iron and Steel Inst.); 133 Cong. Rec. S5615 (daily ed. Apr.
28, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter).
19 The Unfair Foreign Competition Act of 1985: Hearing on S. 1655 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Hearing] (testimony
of Richard 0. Cunningham, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson); 133 Cong. Rec. S8691 (daily ed.
June 25, 1987) (same).
20 See text accompanying notes 139-43 infra.
21 In the past decade, at least 18 bills have been introduced on a private right of action to
counteract dumping. See S. 1204, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 13-14 (1989); S. 179, 101st Cong.,
Ist Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); S. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987); S. 1104, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec.
55616 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1987); H.R. Rep. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 166-167, 133
Cong. Rec. H2642 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (amending H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987));
S. 361, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987); H.R. 3, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. § 138 (1987); H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 138 (1986); S. 2408, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986); H.R. 4508, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. E902 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1986); S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S.
236, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 418, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 127, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); S. 2517, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2167, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 938,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 223, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1979). In the most recent
session of Congress, legislators have expressed interest in a private right of action against
dumping, but only a private right of action against customs fraud has has been proposed as of
yet. See 137 Cong. Rec. 55121 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("[Ilf
private parties had access to the courts to... stop dumping... it would be enormously helpful
to trade in our Nation.... [But] at this time, I am taking the first step on a private right of
action to stop customs fraud.").
There also have been seven hearings on the proposed private right of action. See Compre-
hensive Trade Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 3 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Hearing]; 1986
Hearing, supra note 12; 1985 Hearing, supra note 19; The Unfair Foreign Competition Act of
1983: Hearing on S. 127 & S. 418 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearing]; Unfair Foreign Competition Act of 1982: Hearings on
S. 2167 & S. 2517 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
[hereinafter 1982 Hearing]; Possible Amendments to the "1916 Antidumping Act": Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980) [hereinafter 1980 Hearing]; Unfair Foreign Competition Act of 1979, S. 938: Hearing
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is the establishment of a private right of action to counteract illegal
dumping. In contrast to the current procedure that requires an adminis-
trative proceeding to determine the propriety of imposing an antidump-
ing duty,23 such a proposal would give United States industries direct
access to federal courts to recover monetary damages for any injury
caused by dumping and, in some cases, to receive injunctive relief halting
the entry of dumped imports.24
Despite its favorable implications, a private right of action raises
grave concerns over its compatibility with the United States's interna-
tional obligations under GATT. Indeed, this Note argues that the estab-
lishment of a private right of action granting domestic firms direct access
to federal courts to seek monetary and injunctive relief against foreign
dumping is a violation of the General Agreement. Part I provides a brief
overview of GATT and the international and domestic antidumping
laws. Part II discusses the problems with the current American an-
tidumping laws and summarizes the proposals for a private right of ac-
tion against dumping as a means to remedy these problems. Part III
analyzes the relation of the proposed bills to five provisions of the Gen-
eral Agreement and concludes that a private right of action is not com-
patible with GATT.
I
OVERVIEW OF GATT AND THE ANTIDUMPING LAWS
A. A Brief Introduction to GATT
1. A History of GA TT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was completed and
signed as an international trade agreement on October 30, 1947.25 Origi-
on S. 938 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Bus. Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Hearing].
22 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 243-44; Almstedt, International
Price Discrimination and the 1916 Antidumping Act-Are Amendments in Order?, 13 Law &
Pol'y Intel Bus. 747, 772-80 (1981); Hansen & Vermulst, The GATT Protocol of Provisional
Application: A Dying Grandfather?, 27 Colum. J. Transnatl L. 263, 304-05 (1989); Note,
Revitalizing A Private Right of Action in Antidumping Cases, 17 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 847
(1985).
23 See text accompanying notes 100-08 infra.
24 See, e.g., 133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(introducing bill giving American industries direct access to federal courts to halt injurious
imports and recover monetary damages).
25 GATT, supra note 1; see also K. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic
Organization 335 (1970) (GATT not organization but merely multilateral agreement); Finlay-
son & Zacher, The GAIT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers, in The Politics of Interna-
tional Organizations 258, 259 (P. Diehl ed. 1989) (GATT never intended to be international
organization).
For fuller discussions of GATT's origins, see W. Brown, The United States and the Resto-
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nally, GATT was intended to be subordinate to the yet unfinished Inter-
national Trade Organization (ITO)26 and was not to come into effect
until the ITO was established formally.27 For numerous reasons, how-
ever, many negotiators argued that GATT should be brought into force
as soon as possible.28 To placate their concerns, GATT was to be applied
provisionally until a definitive application could be achieved. 29 As a pro-
visional measure, GATT was to have limited force and would not affect a
contracting party's prior legislation that was inconsistent with the Gen-
eral Agreement. 30 It was assumed that when the ITO charter finally was
ration of World Trade 67-162 (1950); R. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Per-
spective 101-09, 145-61, 269-86, 348-80 (1969); J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 35-
57; A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 11-21; C. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade 3-52 (1949).
26 See Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, GATT Doc. L/6474 (1989),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 306, 319 para. 5.5 (36th Supp. 1990); J. Jackson, World
Trading System, supra note 2, at 32-34. The ITO charter was to be completed in 1948. See id.
at 34. In addition to imposing a "code of conduct" on government restraints on international
trade, the ITO was intended to collect statistics, produce uniform definitions and classifica-
tions, issue guidelines for customs valuations, and resolve trade disputes. See A. Lowenfeld,
supra note 2, at 16.
27 See I. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 32-34; J. Jackson & W. Davey,
supra note 4, at 295. In addition, many negotiators needed parliamentary approval before
agreeing to those portions of GATT dealing with nontariff barriers and other general matt :rs.
See, e.g., Second Session of the Preparatory Comm. of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment (lst mtg.) at 11, 19, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV/1 (1947) (dele-
gates of Norway and France reporting need to place General Agreement before respective
Parliaments for approval); Second Session of the Preparatory Comm. of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment (2d mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV/2
(1947) (Czechoslovakia reporting requirement of Assembly approval); see also J. Jackson,
World Trade, supra note 2, at 62 (governments have authority to agree to lower tariffs but
cannot, without parliamentary approval, agree to nontariff barriers of GATT); J. Jackson &
W. Davey, supra note 4, at 295 (discussing requirement of parliamentary approval).
28 The principal reason was the concern for getting the tariff reduction portions of the
General Agreement in operation quickly. See Second Session of the Preparatory Comm. of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (Ist mtg.) at 3, 23-24, U.N. Doc. E/
PC/T/TAC/PV/1 (1947).
29 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 35. This agreement provided
that contracting parties would undertake to "apply provisionally on and after 1 January 1948:
(a) Parts I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and (b) Part II of that
Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." Protocol of Provi-
sional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 [hereinafter Protocol or Protocol of Provisional
Application], reprinted in IV BISD, supra note 1, at 77, 77-78.
30 See Rogoff & Gauditz, The Provisional Application of International Agreements, 39
Me. L. Rev. 29, 67 (1987); see also Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears,
supra note 26 (Protocol enabled governments to accept GATT without adjusting domestic
legislation).
This procedure was praised immediately for its creativity. One delegate described the
Protocol as an "ingenious way of solving quite a difficult problem." Second Session of the
Preparatory Comm. of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (1st mtg.)
at 3-4, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV/1 (1947) (statement of Dr. H. Coombs, Delegate, Aus-
tralia). The mechanism, however, is not without its critics. See K. Dam, supra note 25, at 342
(The Protocol is "one of the principal weaknesses of the General Agreement as a codification
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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submitted, GATT would be submitted for "definitive" application as
well.31
However, this plan did not materialize as envisioned. The ITO
charter never was approved, largely because of opposition in the United
States Congress,32 thrusting the dual roles of multinational trade agree-
ment and international organization upon GATT.33 GATT has lum-
bered along in this dual capacity without adequate legal structures or a
basic constitution for over forty years.
3 4
2. The Principles of GATT
Trade liberalization is the starting point for a discussion of modern
international economic relations. 35 "Liberal trade" is committed to min-
imizing the amount of government interference in trade crossing national
borders. 36 GATT explicitly endorses this principle in its preamble, stat-
ing that the General Agreement is directed toward the "substantial re-
duction of tariffs and other barriers to trade."37 As such, GATT
generally is opposed to both tariff38 and nontariff barriers. 39 Although
the preferred approach is simply to prohibit nontariff barriers,40 regula-
tion of the barrier is a viable alternative where prohibition is not feasible
due to the complicated or controversial nature of the barrier (as is true
of a rule of law in economic affairs.").
31 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 36; J. Jackson & W. Davey,
supra note 4, at 295.
32 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 20-21; Alford, supra note 2, at 83 n.23. The death-
knell for the ITO came in December 1950, when President Truman refused to resubmit the
ITO Charter to Congress for approval. See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 50.
33 See J. Jeckson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 33, 38 (although intended as
multilateral treaty, GATT is international organization); Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 25,
at 259 (when ITO failed, GATT transformed from temporary agreement into normative-insti-
tutional framework). See generally J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 119-22 (discuss-
ing whether GATT is international organization).
34 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 51 (upon failure of ITO, GAIT found
itself without adequate legal and constitutional base); J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra
note 2, at 38 (GATT lacks basic "constitution" designed to regulate its organizational activi-
ties and procedures); Gadbaw, The Outlook for GAIT as an Institution, in Managing Trade
Relations in the 1980s: Issues Involved in the GATT Ministerial Meeting of 1982, 33, 37 (S.
Rubin & T. Graham eds. 1984) (GATT lacks resources, secretariat, decisiomaking frame-
work, and procedures for taking on complex new issues).
35 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 8.
36 Id.
37 GATT, supra note 1, preamble; see also A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 23 (GATT
committed to keeping government restraints of trade to minimum).
38 See K. Dam, supra note 25, at 17.
39 See id. at 19. Nontariff barriers are impediments to the free flow of goods or services in
international trade other than tariffs, such as dumping, government subsidies, and quotas. See
L. Glick, Multilateral Trade Negotiations: World Trade After the Tokyo Round 7 n.6 (1984).
40 See K. Dam, supra note 25, at 19.
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with antidumping laws).41 Furthermore, the only changes in trade per-
missible under GATT are those reducing the obstacles to free trade.42
Another fundamental principle of GATT is nondiscriminatory trad-
ing.43 Specifically, all contracting parties are obligated to treat all other
contracting parties equally44 and to accord products of foreign origin no
less favorable treatment than products of domestic origin.45 A primary
motivation behind this principle is to prevent domestic taxes and regula-
tory policies from being used as protectionist measures.46
Finally, GATI'T is founded on the principle that conditions of trade
should be discussed and agreed on within a multilateral framework.47
GATT provides for multilateral tariff and trade negotiations, or
"rounds," that are "reciprocal and mutually advantageous" to all con-
tracting parties and are aimed at the substantial reduction of trade
barriers.
48
These principles are subject to various qualifications and corol-
laries.49 Nevertheless, one cannot assess the validity of action by a con-
tracting party that may affect international trade adversely or impinge
upon the rights and obligations of another contracting party except by
reference to the fundamental principles of liberalization, nondiscrimina-
tion, and multilateral negotiation. Having briefly examined GATT's his-
tory and principles, the specific nontariff barrier that is the focus of the
remainder of this Note, antidumping laws, will now be examined.
41 See id. at 19-20.
42 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 23 ("Government restraints on the movement of
goods should be kept to a minimum, and if changed, should be reduced, not increased.").
43 See GATT, supra note 1, preamble (GATT directed at "elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce"); A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 23 (same).
44 This principle is known as "most-favored-nation" treatment. Because this Note deals
only with discrimination of the "national treatment" variety, see note 45 infra, no further
discussion of the "most-favored-nation" principle or of article I of GATT is provided.
45 See GATT, supra note 1, art. III ("The products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requriements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transpor-
tation, distribution or use."). This principle is known as "national treatment."
46 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 189.
47 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 23.
48 GATT, supra note 1, art. XXVIII, para. 1; United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Sugar, GATT Doc. L/6514 (1989), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 331, 342, para. 5.3
(36th Supp. 1990); J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 240-41; A. Lowenfeld, supra note
2, at 23.
The "rounds" include: Dillon Round (1962); Kennedy Round (1963-67); Tokyo Round
(1973-79); and Uruguay Round (1987-91). See Martyn, International Trade: The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 29 Harv. Int'l L.J. 199, 199 n.1 (1988).
49 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 24-27 (discussing exceptions, grandfather clauses,
and special cases).
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B. Antidumping Laws and GAYT
1. The Policies Underlying Antidumping Laws
Antidumping laws are a type of "market corrective," providing a
remedy when a foreign industry engages in certain unfair acts5o to the
detriment of a domestic industry. These acts are viewed as deviations
from the "natural" rules of efficient, competitive markets.51 Antidump-
ing laws, therefore, correct "exceptional events" by imposing a duty rais-
ing the low price of imports to what it should have been if the foreign
producer had operated under the "normal" conditions of competitive
markets.5
2
There are three types of dumping: sporadic, continuous, and preda-
tory.5 3 Sporadic dumping is the occasional sale of overstock at low
prices in a "fire sale" fashion. 54 In this situation, a foreign producer un-
loads overstock in a nondomestic market so that its domestic price struc-
ture is not endangered.55 In contrast, a foreign producer who dumps
continuously assumes that its long-term costs will be reduced if it manu-
factures a large number of items, thus realizing maximum economies of
50 See Tarulo, Beyond Normalcy of International Trade, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 547, 549
(1987).
51 See id.
52 See id. "Normal" conditions are those conditions prevailing without government inter-
vention. Id. at 550.
53 See J. Viner, supra note 8, at 23-34; Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 85, 88-89, 144 (1973) [hereinafter
Fisher, Antidumping Law]; Fisher, Dumping: Confronting the Paradox of Internal Weakness
and External Challenge, in Antidumping Law: Policy and Implementation 11, 13 (1979)
[hereinafter Fisher, Confronting the Paradox].
Some delegates at the drafting of GATT argued that treatment should vary according to
the type of dumping. They proposed limiting the restriction on dumping under article VI to
only the practice of "systematical dumping." See Preparatory Comm. of the International
Conference on Trade and Employment, Sub-Comm. for General Commercial Policy at 7, U.N.
Doe. E/PC/T/C.II/32 (1946) (one can only speak of commercial dumping when there is sys-
tematical manner in acting); Preparatory Comm. of the International Conference on Trade
and Employment, Technical Sub-Comm. (6th mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doe. E/PC/T/C.II/46 (1946)
(statement of Mr. le Bon, Delegate, Belgium) (definition should embody concept of systematic
dumping). This attempt was unsuccessful in part because it was noted that sporadic dumping
could be as injurious as systematic dumping. See id. at 14 (statement of Mr. Johnson, Dele-
gate, United States) (sporadic dumping apt to be more injurious in particular cases than sys-
tematic dumping).
54 See Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note 53, at 13. Whether antidumping laws
can regulate sporadic dumping effectively is an open question. Compare J. Viner, supra note 8,
at 358-59 and W. Wares, The Theory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy 84 (1977)
with Barcel6, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, in Antidumping Law: Policy
and Implementation 53, 70-75 (1979) (antidumping laws provide inadequate relief for non-
predatory injuries dumping) and Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note 53, at 13 (spo-
radic dumping of little concern to importing country).
55 See J. Viner, supra note 8, at 23-24; Fisher, Antidumping Law, supra note 53, at 88.
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scale.5 6 Provided a product's average price exceeds its average cost of
production, the producer is assured a sustained profit from overall
sales.57 Finally, predatory dumping is used to strengthen or secure a
foothold in a nondomestic market by forestalling the development of
competition or by eliminating existing competition entirely.5 8 A foreign
producer will sell its product abroad at prices below marginal cost for
brief periods, undercutting any competitors. 59 Once competition is lim-
ited severely, the foreign producer then charges monopolistic prices for
the product in the target market, thus recouping its losses.60
For decades, injurious dumping has been considered unfair. Both
international and domestic rules have developed permitting duties to be
levied to offset such practices,61 even though the distinction between
"fair" and "unfair" trade increasingly has become blurred. 62 The pre-
vailing explanation of why dumping practices are unfair is based on mar-
ket efficiency. Normally, those enterprises that survive are the most
efficient and thus deserve the benefits of their efficiency.63 When, by
means of dumping, a producer receives benefits for reasons other than
superior efficiency, the market's "weeding out" function is undermined.
A producer able to reduce prices below cost because of a subsidy received
from higher prices elsewhere is deemed to be operating "unfairly."
Other producers, proponents argue, should not be forced to bear the loss
56 See Fisher, Antidumping Law, supra note 53, at 89.
57 See id. Whether antidumping laws should regulate continuous dumping also is con-
tested. Compare Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note 53, at 13-14, 23 (arguing that
continous dumping scheme cannot endure without government regulation) with Barcel6, supra
note 54, at 75-77 (products continuously dumped indistinguishable from other imports).
58 See Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note 53, at 13.
59 See J. Viner, supra note 8, at 26-27; Fisher, Antidumping Law, supra note 53, at 88-89.
Professor Barcel6 questions the likelihood of international predatory dumping. See Barcel6,
supra note 54, at 65-66; Barcel6, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade--The United States
and the International Antidumping Code, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 491, 502 (1972).
60 Monopolistic pricing can be sustained only if there are high barriers to market entry.
"[I]t is not enough simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick
entry by new competitors .... ." Matsushita Elee. Indus. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1985).
While it generally is agreed that predatory dumping is condemnable and should be regu-
lated, the issue is still debated. Compare Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note 53, at 13
(consensus is that predatory dumping is unfair trade practice) with Barcel6, supra note 54, at
65-69 (same) and Barcel6, supra note 59, at 500-02 (arguing that duties to conteract predatory
dumping produce chilling effects on price competition and should be cautiously applied).
61 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 217. Professor Lowenfeld has
described the practice of dumping facetiously as the "premier sin of international trade."
Lowenfeld, Fair or Unfair Trade: Does it Matter?, 13 Cornell Int'l L.J. 205, 206 (1980).
62 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 217; J. Jackson & W. Davey,
supra note 4, at 648; Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 206.
63 See Hudec, United States Compliance with the 1967 GATT Antidumping Code, in An-
tidumping Law: Policy and Implementation 205, 206 (1979); Tarullo, supra note 50, at 552-
54.
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from such unfair competitive practices. 64
Trade laws aimed at unfair dumping practices typically seek to
"level the playing field."' 65 Implicit in this concept is the notion that a
business that sells the same product at different prices to different persons
is acting unfairly,66 and that it must set a single, universal price based on
the cost of production.67 In particular, these laws attempt to prevent
predatory "price gouging' 68 by which a large, economically powerful
firm uses other aspects of its business to subsidize lower prices for a par-
ticular product to undersell small businesses competing in the same mar-
ket, eventually reducing competition so in the long run it can raise prices
and reap monopoly benefits.
69
While the theoretical rationale behind antidumping laws may be
sound,70 their practical application is considerably more problematic be-
cause not every instance of differential pricing represents economic ineffi-
ciency or predatory intent. "[T]here can be dumping for honorable and
rational enterprise motives of competitive profit maximization. '71 For
example, a rational, nonpredatory supplier may set different domestic
and export prices in response to varying demand conditions in a genuine
effort to maximize profits.72 Likewise, a corporation may be forced to
dump because it perceives technological change to be moving so quickly
that it must sell its inventory of a particular product or run the risk of its
obsolescence. 73 Finally, a corporation may price a product lower in a
64 See Hudec, supra note 63, at 206.
65 J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 218. By attempting to "level the
playing field," a government seeks to preserve competitive markets from foreign governments
advancing their own national objectives through subsidies or from foreign manufacturers en-
gaging in noncompetitive practices by dumping. See id. at 17.
66 See id. at 223; Jackson, Dumping in International Trade, in Antidumping Law and
Practice 1, 4 (J. Jackson & E. Vermuist eds. 1989).
67 See Barcelo, supra note 54, at 59. Barcel6 calls this the "most important misconception
about dumping." Id.
68 Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in Antidumping Law and
Practice 23, 25 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds. 1989).
69 See K. Dam, supra note 25, at 169; J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at
223-24; Fisher, Antidumping Law, supra note 53, at 85, 87. The likely success of such a
scheme is subject to serious question. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S.
574, 589 (1985) (predatory pricing schemes rarely tried and even more rarely successful).
70 This rationale is subject to the assumption that predatory pricing permits an enterprise
to hold on to its price-cutting advantage long enough to recoup its initial losses. See note 297
and accompanying text infra.
71 Jackson, Introduction: Perspectives on Antidumping Law and Policy, in Antidumping
Law: Policy and Implementation 1, 4 (1979) (emphasis in original).
72 See K. Dam, supra note 25, at 170 (difference in price may reflect differences in competi-
tive conditions); Barcel6, supra note 54, at 59 ("A rational, nonpredatory supplier may dump
merely because he is responding to different demand conditions in a genuine effort to maximize
profits.").
73 See Memo from Finance Comm. Trade Staff to Finance Comm. Members (1986), re-
printed in 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 7; note 134 and accompanying text infra.
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particular foreign market simply to meet competition in that market.74
Insofar as antidumping laws fail to distinguish procompetitive from
anticompetitive dumping, their ultimate effect will be higher consumer
costs. 75 Therefore, the policies underlying antidumping laws often may
be at odds with the policies embodied in other laws governing trade, par-
ticularly antitrust laws.76 Antitrust laws generally are intended to benefit
consumers.77 Antidumping laws, on the other hand, protect domestic
competitors from low-priced imports even when such protection does not
benefit consumers or enhance competition.78 Antitrust policy favors vig-
orous competition from all sources, including imports. Antidumping
policy seeks to protect American competitors from unfair foreign price
discrimination and is skeptical of vigorous import competition.79 These
policy differences often come into sharp conflict, especially when anti-
trust laws80 are viewed as a means of remedying antidumping activities.81
2. GAMT's Antidumping Scheme
Special provisions specifically directed at dumping were added dur-
ing the negotiations of the General Agreement in 1947.82 After several
74 See K. Dam, supra note 25, at 168.
75 See Barcel6, supra note 59, at 501 (mere existence of antiprice discrimination laws pro-
duces some chilling effect on price competition).
76 See Vermulst, The Antidumping Systems of Australia, Canada, the EEC and the USA,
in Antidumping Law and Practice 425, 459 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds. 1989).
77 See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 n.49 (1984)
(antitrust statute especially intended to serve interests of consumers); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc.
v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir. 1989) (antitrust laws designed for
consumers), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthal-
mology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989) (antitrust laws concern consumers' welfare and
efficient organization of production); cf. Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Pro-
spective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 957
(1987) (economics tool that can help keep antitrust system on course to help consumers and to
facilitate dynamic competition).
78 See 1983 Hearing, supra note 21, at 24-25 (testimony of William F. Baxter, Assistant
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division); S. Rep. No. 295, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Report] (letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney,
Department of Justice); K. Dam, supra note 25, at 168 (dumping concerned with protection of
domestic industries from international competition).
79 See Report of the Ad-Hoc Comm. on Antitrust and Antidumping of the Am. Bar Assoc.
Section on Antitrust Law, 43 Antitrust L.J. 653, 691 (1974).
80 See notes 114-18 and accompanying text infra.
81 See 1983 Hearing, supra note 21, at 124-30 (testimony of A. Paul Victor, Partner, Well,
Gotshall & Manges) (discussing purpose of 1916 Antidumping Act in prohibiting predatory
dumping); text accompanying notes 119-20 infra.
A private right of action also might undercut consumer rights protected by the antitrust
laws because domestic firms "injured" by efficient foreign competition may sue, and the threat
of private lawsuits will deter competitive low pricing by foreign firms. Interview with Eleanor
Fox, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, in New York City (May 4, 1990).
82 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 225; Jackson, supra note 66, at 6.
These special provisions were approved by the negotiators because "[t]here was general con-
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drafts,83 article VI was finalized to provide:
The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of
one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at
less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the
territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment
of a domestic industry.... In order to offset or prevent dumping, a
contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping
duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping .... 84
As worded, article VI is an anomaly. It is an "exception" to
GATT,8 5 allowing measures that contravene GATT's general principles
of trade liberalization and nondiscriminatory treatment.8 6 But the article
also is careful to limit the scope of this exception by imposing an affirma-
tive obligation upon GATT contracting parties to use only narrowly cir-
cumscribed measures to counteract dumping.8
7
Because antidumping duties easily can be used as a protectionist de-
vice,88 the GATT contracting parties occasionally have attempted to up-
date the antidumping laws to respond to the realities of international
economic relations. Following the failure of a previous Antidumping
Code,89 the contracting parties negotiated the Antidumping Code of
sent among the majority of the countries in the discussions on Anti-dumping... Duties that
circumstances might arise in which such duties may properly be applied." Preparatory
Comm. of the International Conference on Trade and Employment at 11, U.N. Doc. E/PC/
T/C.II/54 (1946).
83 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 405-06.
84 GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, paras. 1-2.
85 See EEC-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, GATT Doc. L/6657 para.
5.17 (1990) (describing article VI as exception to General Agreement) (on file at New York
University Law Review).
86 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 411. Article VI is an exception because
antidumping duties are applied in addition to the normal duty imposed on the imports from
the country concerned. As a result, imports from the dumping country are treated less favora-
bly than imports of nondumping countries, thus deviating from the GAT norm of nondis-
criminatory treatment. See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 155. Furthermore, because article
VI permits governmental interference through the imposition of antidumping duties, it is
somewhat incongruous with GATTs principle of trade liberalization. See text accompanying
notes 35-42 supra.
87 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 411; see also EEC-Regulation on Imports
of Parts and Components, GATT Doc. L/6657 para. 5.17 (1990) (article VI recognizes legiti-
macy of certain policy objectives but at same time sets out conditions as to obligations that
may be imposed to secure attainment of that objective) (on fie at New York University Law
Review).
88 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 226. Problems often result from
antidumping procedures such as miscalculations of the margin of dumping and inaccurate
injury determinations. Such activity can cause distortions of international trade and transform
the antidumping duties into a protectionist device. See id,
89 The Antidumping Code of 1967 was negotiated as part of the Kennedy Round (1962-
1967) of trade negotiations. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT,
GATI Doc. L/2812 (1967), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 24, 24-35 (15th Supp. 1968).
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1979,90 which provides for significant procedural and administrative
changes designed to guard against protectionist abuse in the administra-
tion of the antidumping laws. 91
Together, GAIT and the Antidumping Code require a showing of a
disparity between a product's export price and its "normal" price92 and
proof of material injury or threat of material injury to the competing
domestic industry.93 If both conditions are met, the importing country
may apply antidumping duties.94 Thus combined, article VI of GATT
and the Antidumping Code of 1979 represent the current international
commitments concerning dumping and provide the means of redress
available to contracting parties.95
It generally is agreed that the Antidumping Code of 1967 and the Kennedy Round were un-
successful in reducing nontariff barriers. See L. Glick, supra note 39, at 8 (little progress in
nontariff arena at Kennedy Round); J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 229 ("[T]he
Kennedy Round made little dent on the plethora of ingenious nontariff barriers. .. "); J.
Jackson, J. Louis & M. Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round 164 (1984) (United States
not living up to its 1967 Antidumping Code obligations).
90 See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650 (1979) [hereinafter Antidumping Code of
1979], reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 171, 171-87 (26th Supp. 1980). It was negotiated as
part of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979). The legal instruments adopted at the Tokyo Round are
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 3, 3-188 (26th Supp. 1980). For a detailed discussion of the
round, see L. Glick, supra note 39, at 15-150; J. Jackson, J. Louis & M. Matsushita, supra note
89, at 164.
91 See L. Glick, supra note 39, at 110-11.
92 The "normal" price is usually the "home market price." See GATT, supra note 1, art.
VI, para. l(a); J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 227; Finger, Antidumping
and Antisubsidy Measures, in The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations 153, 153-55 (J. Finger & A. Olechowski eds. 1987).
93 See GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 1. Injury is based on positive evidence and an
objective examination of the volume of the dumped imports, their effect on prices in the do-
mestic market, and the impact of those imports on domestic producers. Antidumping Code of
1979, supra note 90, art. 3, para. 1.
94 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 227. Such duties must remain
consistent with the rules in GAT and the Antidumping Code of 1979. See id. at 227-28.
Note that GATT does not impose an obligation on contracting parties to act when dump-
ing occurs. Rather, it merely permits them to act against dumping. See Swedish Antidumping
Duties, GATT Doc. L/328 (1955), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 81, 83, para. 8 (3d
Supp. 1955) (article VI does not oblige importing country to levy antidumping duty).
95 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 227. The Antidumping Code,
like all other codes resulting from the GATT Rounds, is not an amendment to GATT but is a
"stand-alone" treaty binding in theory only upon those GATT parties who are signatories to
that code. See id. at 55-56. But see Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, The GAT Codes and the Uncon-
ditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle, 12 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 59, 62 (1980) (questioning
whether contracting parties may be obliged to extend benefits of newly assumed code obliga-
tions to all GAT members).
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C. Antidumping Laws of the United States
1. Implementation of GA77
American antidumping laws closely parallel those of GATT, with
the United States taking full advantage of the powers vested in con-
tracting parties by the GATT provisions. Under United States law, an
antidumping duty must be imposed on merchandise that is being, or is
likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value if this sale
materially injures, threatens to injure materially, or materially retards
the establishment of a domestic industry.96 The duty imposed must
equal the margin of dumping. 97 The United States's antidumping laws
are less flexible than GATT's, the former requiring a duty to compensate
for dumping,98 whereas the latter merely allows for such a duty.99
For an antidumping duty to be levied on an import into the United
States, two administrative agencies must agree that a duty is mandated.
The Department of Commerce (DOC) determines whether dumping ex-
ists;1°° the International Trade Commission (ITC) determines whether
the dumping has inflicted a "material injury" to a domestic industry. 101
The determination process is initiated once an interested party10 2 files a
complaint.10 3 The ITC then must make a preliminary determination
within forty-five days as to the likelihood of finding an injury, °4 and the
DOC must make a preliminary determination within 160 days as to the
likelihood of dumping. 10 5 If both make positive findings, a new inquiry is
begun that results in a final determination. Again, the ITC determines
96 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988); see also J. Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 4, at 674-77
(presenting overview of United States antidumping law).
97 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (duty must equal amount by which foreign market value ex-
ceeds United States price for merchandise).
98 See id. (if dumping and injury occurs, then antidumping duty "shall be imposed"); Hor-
lick, The United States Antidumping System, in Antidumping Law and Practice 99, 102 (J.
Jackson & E. Vermulst eds. 1989) (American antidumping law is nondiscretionary).
99 See GATr, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 2 (Stating that "a contracting party may levy...
an antidumping duty").
100 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 229.
101 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673; J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 229.
102 "Interested Party" includes foreign and domestic manufacturers, foreign governments,
unions, and trade associations. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1988).
103 See id. § 1673a(b). Although the Commerce Department also may initiate an investiga-
tion, this is not the normal practice. See id. § 1673a(a); Restani, An Introduction to Statutory
Responses to Import Penetration, 18 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1087, 1088 (1986).
104 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a). A negative determination terminates the investigation. See
id.
105 See id. § 1673b(b)(1)(A). Under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
an expedited procedure for investigations of "short life cycle merchandise" limits the determi-
nation to 100 or 120 days. See id. § 1673b(b). See generally T. Vakerics, D. Wilson & K.
Weigel, Antidumping, Countervailing Duty, and Other Trade Actions 36-40 (Supp. 1989)
(discussing new legislation on short life-cycle merchandise).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 1991]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
whether material injury to an existing or emerging domestic industry has
resulted from the dumping,10 6 and the DOC determines whether the
merchandise is being sold at less than fair value.10 7 An affirmative final
determination by both agencies results in the imposition of an antidump-
ing duty. 10 8
Little power actually is vested in the hands of the private party initi-
ating this process. Under the current procedure, a private party only can
file a petition requesting an investigation of alleged dumping, appear at
hearings, and submit pre- and posthearing briefs. 10 9 No private right of
action is available under the current American implementation of
GATT.
2 The Antidumping Act of 1916
There may be a private right of action, under legislation predating
GATT, that theoretically provides relief to domestic industries injured
by foreign predatory dumping: the Antidumping Act of 1916 (Act).110
To prove a violation of the 1916 Act, there must be evidence that (1) an
importer has imported or sold articles within the United States at prices
substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such
articles; (2) the resulting international price discrimination was common
and systematic; and (3) the discriminatory pricing was undertaken with
the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States,
preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or re-
straining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such arti-
cles in the United States. 1 Violators of the Act are subject to civil
12
106 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b).
107 See id. § 1673d(a)(1).
108 See id. § 1673d(c)(2), e(a).
109 See Sims & Scott, Antitrust Consequences to Private Parties of Participation in and
Settlement of Selected Trade Actions, 56 Antitrust L.J. 561, 566 (1987).
110 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1988)). It provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any articles from
any foreign country into the United States, commonly and systematically to import, sell
or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the United States at a price substan-
tially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of
exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country of their produc-
tion, or of other foreign countries to which they are commonly exported.... Provided,
That such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the
United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or
of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the
United States.
Id.
111 See id.; Kessler, The Antidumping Act of 1916: Antitrust Analogue or Anathema?, 56
Antitrust L.J. 485, 485-86 (1987).
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 72 (providing for treble civil damages).
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and criminal liability 113
The legislative history1 14 and subsequent judicial construction' 15 of
the Act emphasize that it is essentially an antitrust remedy1 6 "aimed
only at international price discrimination engaged in with a specific pred-
atory intent."'1 17 Thus, the Act is merely a remedy for particularly egre-
gious forms of deliberate price undercutting." 8 Any attempt to amend
the Act by lessening its predatory intent requirement must wrestle with
its history and subsequent construction as an antitrust remedy.119 This
would prove difficult. For example, extending the Antidumping Act of
1916 to cover other forms of antidumping activity other than predatory
dumping probably could not be reconciled with the antitrust policy of
encouraging vigorous price competition.1 20
The specific intent requirement essentially abrogates the effective-
ness of the Act as a remedy for unfair foreign competition. 121 To estab-
113 See id. (criminal conviction punishable as misdemeanor).
114 See 53 Cong. Rec. app. 1938 (1916) (statement of Rep. Kitchin).
115 See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1986)
(since Sherman Act conspiracy charge failed, Antidumping Act conspiracy claim also must
fail); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 319, 325 n.4 (3d Cir. 1983) (same),
rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). For a complete listing of cases construing the
Act through 1985, see Kessler, supra note 111, at 491 n.31.
116 See Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 112 F.R.D. 439, 544 (1986) (testimony of Charlene Barshefsky, Partner, Steptoe &
Johnson); 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 211 (testimony of Charlene Barshefsky, Partner,
Steptoe & Johnson); 1983 Hearing, supra note 21, at 121 (testimony of A. Paul Victor, Part-
ner, WeLl, Gotshal & Manges); Kessler, supra note 111, at 488-93; Victor, Antidumping and
Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies Be Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 339, 344-46
(1983). But see 1979 Hearing, supra note 21, at 23-24 (testimony of Bart Fisher, Partner,
Patton, Boggs & Blow) (questioning inclusion of Antidumping Act of 1916 under antitrust
laws).
Arguably, the Act has a dual role of protecting domestic industries and discouraging
anticompetitive activity. The goal of the first two sections of the specific intent proviso is the
protection of domestic industries. The third seeks to discourage anticompetitive activity. See
15 U.S.C. § 72. The 1916 Act is thus a hybrid, having both antitrust and antidumping under-
pinnings. See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 401 (antidumping duties seek to im-
pose tariff and antitrust penalties).
117 Kessler, supra note 111, at 493.
118 See 1980 Hearing, supra note 21, at 133 (testimony of Dudley H. Chapman, Former
Assistant Chief, Department of Justice Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division);
Kessler, supra note 111, at 488.
119 See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 212 (testimony of Charlene Barshefsky, Partner,
Steptoe & Johnson) (disassociating Act from its antitrust foundations would nullify careful
distinction between predatory and competitively neutral dumping).
120 See Kessler, supra note 111, at 495; text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
121 See 1980 Hearing, supra note 21, at 24 (statement of the Ad-Hoc Labor-Industry Trade
Coalition); id. at 134 (testimony of Peter 0. Suchman and Gail T. Cumins, Attorneys, Shar-
retts, Paley, Carter & Blauvelt, P.C.).
In addition to the intent requirement, other obstacles exist that prevent the Act from
being a strong antidumping measure. The "common and systematic" element, for example,
requires that the price discrimination be something other than an irregular or single instance of
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lish a prima facie claim under the Antidumping Act of 1916, plaintiffs
must show more than a general intent to restrain trade.122 They must
prove that the act of selling at low prices was done with the conscious
object of undermining competitors-that is, specific intent.123 Because of
this stringent "specific, predatory, [and] anticompetitive intent" require-
ment,12 4 there has never been a successful claim under the 1916 Act in its
seventy-five year history.1 25 Thus, there is general agreement among
commentators that the Antidumping Act of 1916, as it now stands, is a
"dead letter. ' 126 Consequently, victims of predatory dumping practices
in the United States have no practical private right of action available to
them.
II
RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED INADEQUACIES IN UNITED
STATES ANTIDUMPING LAWS: A PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION
Few would argue that present laws in the United States successfully
meet the needs of domestic industries competing with foreign competi-
discrimination. See Kessler, supra note 111, at 486. That is, only continuous predatory dump-
ing, not sporadic dumping, gives rise to liability.
122 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 319, 327-28 (3d Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
123 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443-44 (1978); In re
Japanese Elec. Prods Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d at 328; Hiscocks, International Price Discrimi-
nation: The Discovery of the Predatory Dumping Act of 1916, 11 Int'l Law. 227, 246 (1977).
124 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251, 259 (E.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
125 See 1982 Hearing, supra note 21, at 124 (testimony of Donald E. deKieffer, General
Counsel, Office of the Special Trade Representative); Applebaum, The Antidumping Laws-
Impact on the Competitive Process, 43 Antitrust LJ. 590, 591 (1974); Silverman, An Exami-
nation of the Antidumping Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 7 Syracuse J. Int'l
L. & Com. 239, 242 n.19 (1979-1980); Note, Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alterna-
tive Approach to Defining "Like Product" and "Domestic Industry" under the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1459, 1466 n.32 (1987).
Other factors weakening the effectiveness of the Antidumping Act of 1916 include: the
obtuseness of its statutory language; its stringent evidence requirements; and the apparent will-
ingness of private businesses to let the government regulate dumping through other means.
See Hiscocks, supra note 123, at 232.
126 See 1987 Hearing, supra note 21, at 720 (testimony of L. Frederick Gieg, Jr., President,
RMI Company); 1985 Hearing, supra note 19, at 55 (testimony of Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Part-
ner, Hughes Hubbard & Reed); 133 Cong. Rec. S10,287 (daily ed. July 21, 1987) (testimony of
Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Partner, Hughes Hubbard & Reed); Marks, United States Antidumping
Laws-A Government Overview, 43 Antitrust L.J. 580, 581 (1974); Prosterman, Withholding
of Appraisement Under the United States Anti-dumping Act: Protectionism or Unfair-Com-
petition Law?, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 315, 316 n.4 (1966); Silverman, supra note 125, at 242 n.19;
Victor, supra note 116, at 339-40. But see Hiscocks, supra note 123, at 232 (because of recent
developments, Antidumping Act very much alive).
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tors who are unfairly dumping. Only some, however, argue that funda-
mental changes are needed in the United States's antidumping
strategy. 12" Others maintain that only minor changes are in order. 128 A
private right of action for manufacturers injured by dumping frequently
is suggested as a solution. As will be shown, however, this alternative is
incompatible with GAiT. 1
29
A. Inadequacies in Current United States Antidumping Laws
A grave flaw in the current antidumping scheme is its failure to de-
ter injurious dumping adequately. 130 Presently, dumping is a risk-free,
no-lose proposition to the extent that relief is entirely prospective. 131
And foreign companies have been ingenious in their ability to circumvent
the imposition of even a prospective antidumping duty. Evasive activi-
ties include "hit and run" dumping,132 inventory dumping,1 33 short life-
127 See, e.g., 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 78 (testimony of Alan W. Wolff, Partner,
Dewey Ballantine) (existing law clearly is inadequate); id. at 132 (statement of Sen. Heinz)
("Clearly, our current laws aren't working."); 1985 Hearing, supra note 19, at 51 (testimony of
Richard 0. Cunningham, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson) (antidumping laws inadequate to deal
with dumping problems encountered by American industries); id. at 57 (testimony of Peter D.
Ehrenhaft, Partner, Hughes Hubbard & Reed) (current laws do not make much sense).
128 See, e.g., 1983 Hearing, supra note 21, at 74 (testimony of Joel Davidow, Partner,
Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon) (already have adequate remedies); 133 Cong. Rec.
S8725 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (antidumping laws working rather
well); Finger, supra note 92, at 160 (discussing "legal view" which believes antidumping code
works reasonably well).
129 The present antidumping scheme also contains numerous other faults which are beyond
the scope of this Note. These problems include the circumvention by foreign companies of
United States antidumping laws, see 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 653 (testimony of Gil-
bert B. Kaplan, Department of Commerce Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administra-
tion) (discussing increasing problem of circumvention of antidumping duty orders), and
multiple dumping. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 91-95 (testimony of Alan W. Wolff,
Partner, Dewey Ballantine) (discussed proposals to address multiple offenders of antidumping
orders); 132 Cong. Rec. S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bingaman) (discuss-
ing harm resulting from repeat offenders of current antidumping laws); T. Vakerics, D. Wilson
& K. Weigel, supra note 105, at 36-37 (discussing multiple dumping requirements of new
"short life cycle" product category).
130 See 1985 Hearing, supra note 19, at 9 (statement of Sen. Heinz); 133 Cong. Rec. S8686
(daily ed. June 25, 1987) (same).
131 See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 58 (testimony of Barton C. Green, General Counsel
and Secretary, American Iron and Steel Inst.); id. at 65 (testimony of William Knoell, Presi-
dent and Chief Executive Officer, Cyclops Corp.); 133 Cong. Rec. S5615 (daily ed. Apr. 28,
1987) (statement of Sen. Specter).
132 "Hit and run" dumping occurs most often in cyclical and seasonal markets. Where
there is a sharp, sudden, and cyclical downswing in demand, there is a major incentive for
companies to increase export sales, even below fully allocated costs. This may be done to
minimize a seasonal devaluation in the price of a product. In this instance, any damage to a
domestic industry occurs before any antidumping action can be prepared and filed. See Memo
from Finance Comm. Trade Staff to Finance Comm. Members (1986), reprinted in 1986 Hear-
ing, supra note 12, at 7; 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 58 (statement of Barton C. Green,
General Counsel and Secretary, American Iron and Steel Inst.); 1985 Hearing, supra note 19,
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cycle dumping, 34 and diversionary dumping. 135 The existing prospec-
tive remedy cannot prevent such dumping activity because the foreign
industry has raised its prices above the discriminatory level by the time a
dumping proceeding is brought or a final order is issued. 136 Proponents
of a private right of action argue that a damages remedy would "provide
an effective deterrent to foreign producers who contemplate such activity
and thus hopefully obviate the need for actual litigation."' 137 Such a pri-
vate remedy would "have a pronounced effect on the pricing policies of
foreign exporters. '1
38
Proponents of a private right of action also argue that a retrospec-
tive remedy will force foreign manufacturers to compensate American
industries for unfair pricing practices.1 39 Domestic companies that have
at 48 (testimony of Richard 0. Cunningham, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson); 1982 Hearings,
supra note 21, at 14 (testimony of Laird Patterson, General Attorney, Bethlehem Steel Corp.);
133 Cong. Rec. S8690 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (testimony of Richard 0. Cunningham, Part-
ner, Steptoe & Johnson); cf. text accompanying notes 54-55 supra (discussing "fire sale"
dumping).
133 Foreign moaufacturers can dump inventory by setting up subsidiary companies in the
United States to import inventory and sell merchandise manufactured in the foreign plant.
Dumping occurs from the domestic subsidiary only after the merchandise has passed through
customs. Because duties can be imposed only upon the crossing of a border, such activity is
immune from any possibility of a duty. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 58 (testimony of
Barton C. Green, General Counsel and Secretary, American Iron and Steel Inst.); 1985 Hear-
ing, supra note 19, at 48-49 (testimony of Richard 0. Cunningham, Partner, Steptoe & John-
son); 1983 Hearing, supra note 21, at 43-44, 61-63 (same); 133 Cong. Rec. S8690 (daily ed.
June 25, 1987) (same).
134 Short life-cycle dumping occurs when there is a fast turnover of or a short life span of a
product because of expanding technology. By the time a dumping case can be brought, the
market has moved on to the next generation of products. See Memo from Finance Comm.
Trade Staff to Finance Comm. Members (1986), reprinted in 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 7.
135 Diversionary dumping occurs when a foreign industry sends its product into another
market to avoid the preexisting duty that would be imposed on the product if it were imported
directly into the country from the country of origin. See T. Vakerics, D. Wilson & K. Weigel,
supra note 105, at 24 n.66 (diversionary dumping subject to new 1988 laws when parts sent to
third country to be made into final product or when third country used to circumvent an-
tidumping order on final product).
136 One proponent of retrospective remedies for dumping noted that the pendency of a
dumping case actually encourages a foreign producer to ship in as much as it can prior to the
conclusion of the case and the issuance of the final dumping order to avoid any duty. See 1985
Hearing, supra note 19, at 8 (statement of Sen. Heinz); 133 Cong. Rec. S8725 (daily ed. June
25, 1987) (same).
137 133 Cong. Rec. S9864 (daily ed. July 14, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter). As an attor-
ney for a major steel association observed, "Nothing would make us happier than having a
statute that would so effectively deal with the pernicious commercial practice of dumping that
it was not necessary to fie either an administrative dumping case or a private action for dam-
ages." 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 55 (testimony of Barton C. Green, General Counsel
and Secretary, American Iron and Steel Inst.).
138 133 Cong. Rec. S8691 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (testimony of Richard 0. Cunningham,
Partner, Steptoe & Johnson). In essence, a private right of action would prevent the foreign
manufacturer from taking a free 'irst bite at the apple." Id.
139 See id. ('Tjhe need for and the logic behind such a [retrospective] damage remedy is so
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suffered a material injury as a result of dumping presently have virtually
no chance for reparations. 14 Under the United States's current an-
tidumping scheme, financial compensation is paid, if at all, into the
United States Treasury, 141 not to those companies injured by foreign
dumping.142 Domestic industries believe they suffer an injustice when,
after attempting to require the foreign manufacturer to pay for its unfair
practices through administrative agency litigation, they find that the pro-
ceeds of any duty imposed fill the pockets of the federal government.
"The company or industry... that may have been badly hurt over a
period of... several years is left with... nothing to show for [its] victory
except perhaps a ruined business."' 143 A private right of action, propo-
nents argue, would correct this problem by allowing domestic companies
to obtain monetary and equitable relief against injurious dumping.
B. Attempts to Find a Remedy: Proposals for a Private
Right of Action
In the past decade, Congress has introduced at least eighteen bills
that would give private parties in the United States a right of action
against foreign dumpers. 144 This activity is evidence of the growing per-
ception by Congress that a private right of action is a plausible and desir-
able means of reducing some of the country's trade problems.
Proponents of the bills argue that a private right of action would provide
a retrospective remedy that would deter dumping effectively and that
would compensate those domestic industries injured by unfair trade
compelling that I cannot see how it is controversial at all.... If an unfair practice injures a
U.S. company, there is no earthly reason why that company should not be recompensed in
damages by the perpetrator of that unfair practice."); 1985 Hearing, supra note 19, at 51 (testi-
mony of Richard 0. Cunningham, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson) (same).
140 The "critical circumstances" exception to the United States's antidumping law, how-
ever, does permit a limited retroactive assessment of duties on products that entered the
United States prior to a preliminary determination. For a discussion of the "critical circum-
stances" exception and the changes to it as a result of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, see T. Vakerics, D. Wilson & K. Weigel, supra note 105, at 21-22.
The Antidumping Code of 1979 also allows for a limited retroactive remedy in extreme
cases, permitting a duty to be levied on products not more than 90 days prior to the day of a
provisional measure. See Antidumping Code of 1979, supra note 90, art. 11, para. 1.
141 See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 88 (prepared statement of Alan W. Wolff, Partner,
Dewey Ballantine).
142 See 132 Cong. Rec. E901 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1986) (statement of Rep. Mica). Many
lawmakers think that antidumping laws should provide compensation to domestic industries
injured by unfair trade practices of foreign exporters. See 133 Cong. Rec. S9864 (daily ed. July
14, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter); 133 Cong. Rec. S8725 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Heinz); 132 Cong. Rec. S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman).
143 See 133 Cong. Rec. S8725 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
144 See note 21 supra.
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practices adequately. 145 This Note does not address the merits of these
arguments. Rather, it only seeks to determine whether a bill granting a
private right of action for dumping, if passed, would be consistent with
the United States's international obligations under GATT.
Because of the sheer number of bills introduced, the complexity of
the different provisions, and the controversy surrounding the creation of
a private right of action in this context, 146 it is virtually impossible to
determine accurately which type of bill, if any, Congress is most likely to
pass. For this reason, instead of discussing each bill in detail, this Note
attempts to categorize the bills by various themes and then address each
theme's relation to GATT. 147
Almost every bill with an antidumping provision has sought to
amend the Antidumping Act of 1916.148 Most of these bills attempt to
alter significantly the prima facie elements 49 of the Act's cause of ac-
tion,15o in particular, the specific predatory intent requirement.151 To
145 See, e.g., 133 Cong. Rec. SIO,286 (daily ed. July 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter)
("It has been my view that domestic companies that have been injured by unfair trade prac-
tices should be compensated for their losses. In addition, a viable damages remedy would
provide an effective deterrent to foreign produers... ."); 133 Cong. Rec. S5615 (daily ed.
Apr. 28, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("[A] damage remedy for injury from illegal imports
would provide a more effective deterrent than current law, would provide retroactive relief to
fill the gap under existing law... and would provide damage awards directly to the injured
American industries.").
146 See 133 Cong. Rec. S8718-41 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (debate on Senate floor regarding
bill that would give private parties right of action against foreign dumping).
147 A table summarizing the salient features of each bill is attached as an Appendix to this
Note.
148 See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1989); S. 179, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135
Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); S. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 8393
(daily ed. June 19, 1987); S. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan.
21, 1987); S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 236 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985). Four of
the 18 bills do not attempt to amend the Antidumping Act of 1916. See H.R. 3, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 138 (1987); H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 138 (1986); S. 2408, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986); H.R. 4508, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132
Cong. Rec. E902 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1986).
149 See text accompanying note 111 supra.
150 The relevant portions of a representative bill are illustrative:
(A) No person shall import or sell within the United States any article manufac-
tured or produced in a foreign country ifi (1) such article is imported or sold within the
United States at a United States price which is less than the foreign market value or
constructed value of such article; and (2) such importation or sale-(i) causes or threat-
ens material injury to industry or labor in the United States, or (ii) prevents, in whole or
in part, the establishment or modernization of any industry in the United States.
(B) Any interested party who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of an importation or sale in violation of this section, may bring a civil action in the
district court of the District of Columbia or in the Court of International Trade against
any manufacturer or exporter of such article or any importer of such article into the
United States who is related to such manufacturer or exporter.
S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1985). For similar provisions, see, e.g., S. 1396, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b), 133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987); S. 361, 100th Cong.,
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offset the reduced intent requirement, most of these bills eliminate the
Act's criminal penalty 152 and its treble damages provision. 153
Proving that a product was "commonly and systematically" im-
ported or sold within the United States presents another barrier to recov-
ery under the Act.1 5 4 Consequently, virtually all the bills that attempt to
amend the Act eliminate this element.1 55 Finally, many of these bills also
reduce the dumping differential that must be shown from "a price sub-
stantially less than"1 56 to a price "less than" that of the country of
origin.157
Ist Sess. § 3(a), 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987); S. 236, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3(a) (1985); S. 2517, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(1) (1982).
151 See text accompanying notes 121-25 supra. Most bills would abolish the specific preda-
tory intent requirement altogether and simply require that the defendant "knowingly and pur-
posely" dumped or "knowingly" dumped. See, e.g., S. 127, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(1) (1983)
(knowingly and purposely dumped); S. 2517, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(1) (1982) (same); S.
2167, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1982) (knowingly dumped). Others include a form of "strict
liability dumping," under which there is no intent requirement. See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. § 13 (1989); S. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b), 133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed.
June 19, 1987); S. 361, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a), 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21,
1987).
Still others allow courts to infer predatory intent or shift the burden of proof to the defen-
dants. Under S. 1104, for example, if the defendant knew, or had reason to know it was
dumping, the defendant shall be treated as having the specific predatory intent. S. 1104, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 801(c)(2)(b)(iii), 133 Cong. Rec. S5616 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1987). Under this
bill, the defendant has the burden of showing that it did not have the specific predatory intent.
See id. § 801(b)(2). This provision parallels another bill under which a repeat offender would
face a "rebuttable presumption" that it had the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in
the United States. See H.R. Rep. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 166(5), 133 Cong. Rec.
H2642 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (amending H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)).
152 See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(a) (1989); S. 179, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ l(b), 135 Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); S. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b),
133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987); S. 1104, 110th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 Cong.
Rec. S5616 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1987); H.R. Rep. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 166(3), 133
Cong. Rec. H2642 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (amending H.R. 3, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987)).
153 See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(a) (1989); H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 138(a) (1987); H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9138(a) (1986). Two bills grant discretion
to the district court to award treble damages. See S. 2408, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b), 132
Cong. Rec. S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986); H.R. 4508, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § l(e), 132 Cong.
Rec. E902 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1986). Only the earlier bills maintain the Act's treble damages
provision. See, e.g., S. 127, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1983); S. 2167, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ (3) (1982); S. 223, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1979).
154 See text accompanying note 111 supra; note 121 supra.
155 See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 13(a) (1989); S. 179, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1(b), 135 Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); S. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b),
133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987); S. 361, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a), 133
Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987); S. 1655, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(a) (1985).
156 15 U.S.C. § 72 (emphasis added); see text accompanying note 11 supra.
157 See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 13(a) (1989); S. 1396, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ l(b), 133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987); S. 361, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a),
133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987); S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1985); S.
418, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(a) (1983).
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The Antidumping Act of 1916 was intended to be an antitrust rem-
edy, having the dual roles of protecting American industries while
discouraging anticompetitive activity.15 But of those bills proposing
amendments to the Act, only five maintain this dual purpose.159 Most
only focus on whether there has been some material injury to a domestic
industry. 16o
Some of these bills also depart from the Act by granting injunctive
relief against foreign exporters who engage in dumping. Under these
bills, foreign dumpers generally could be enjoined from importing or sell-
ing their articles in the United States regardless of the foreign exporters'
willingness to raise prices to an acceptable level.161 Most of these bills
also provide for a final version of discretionary injunctive relief if a defen-
dant fails to comply with a discovery order or other decree of the
court.
16 2
158 See text accompanying notes 114-20 supra; note 116 supra.
159 For example, one of these five bills penalizes foreign underselling if:
ET]he sale of such articles at such price would (i) cause material injury to an industry...
[in] the United States, (ii) prevent, in whole or in part, the establishment of an industry
in the United States, or (iii) restrain or monopolize any part of trade and commerce in
such articles in the United States ....
S. 127, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1983); see also S. 1104, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec.
S5616 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1987) (employing similar language); H.R. Rep. No. 40, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 166, 133 Cong. Rec. H2642 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (amending H.R. 3, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)) (same); S. 2517, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(1) (1982) (same); S. 938, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(1) (1979) (same).
One bill reduces the Act to an antitrust remedy alone, with the inquiry being limited to
whether "the effect of such sale has been to substantially lessen competition or to restrain trade
or monopolize any part of trade or commerce within the United States." S. 223, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 501 (1979).
160 Thus, none of these bills contains any mention of protecting the marketplace in general.
Rather, they typically state:
No person shall import or sell within the United States any article manufactured or
produced in a foreign ountry ... [at a price less than the foreign market value of such
article where] such importation or sale-(A) causes or threatens material injury to in-
dustry... in the United States; or (B) prevents the establishment or modernization of
any industry in the United States.
S. 1204, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(a) (1989); see also S. 179, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b), 135
Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (employing similar language); S. 1396, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 1(b), 133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987) (same); S. 361, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3(a), 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987) (same).
161 See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 13(a) (1989) (plaintiff may be granted injunc-
tion against further importation, sale, or distribution within United States by defendant); S.
179, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b), 135 Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (same); S.
1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b), 133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987) (same); S.
2167, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1982) (same).
162 See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(a) (1989) (if defendant fails to comply with
any discovery order court may enjoin further importation, sale, or distribution within United
States by defendant); S. 179, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b), 135 Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan.
25, 1989) (same); S. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b), 133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June
19, 1987) (same); S. 361, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a), 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21,
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Procedurally, the bills generally are silent as to whether bringing a
private right of action would displace the existing administrative rem-
edy. 163 Such silence reasonably could be construed as allowing the peti-
tioner to file a complaint in both forums and thus petition for either
monetary damages and/or an antidumping duty. 164 Two bills, however,
do provide the complainant explicitly with a choice between antidump-
ing duty or private damages.
165
Thus the proposed bills largely attempt to amend the Antidumping
Act of 1916 by diluting its prima facie elements. To succeed, a plaintiff
only need show a general intent to sell at less than the home price and
that more than a de minimis injury was suffered by a domestic industry.
If these weakened requirements are met, both monetary and equitable
relief are available. Nevertheless, most of these bills also state, "It is the
sense of Congress that the provisions of this Act are consistent with, and
in accord with, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)." 1 66 The burden is on the United States, however, to show that
this is the case.1 67 Whether it can satisfy this burden is an open question.
1987) (same); S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1985) (same).
163 See text accompanying notes 96-108 supra.
164 See 135 Cong. Rec. S1 19 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("The bill
[S. 179] I introduce] today... would not displace any existing remedies through the ITC or
otherwise."); 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987) (S. 361 would not displace any
existing remedy through ITC).
Despite the silence as to whether most bills would allow a petitioner to take the "duty
route" or the "damages route," many bills do allow a petitioner to seek damages in either the
federal district court of the District of Columbia or before the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade. See, e.g., S. 1204, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(a) (1989); S. 179, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. § l(b), 135 Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)
(1983).
165 See S. 2408, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § (d), 132 Cong. Rec. S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986)
(petitioner may elect to allow imposition of duties or preserve right to seek damages from
foreign producers); H.R. 4508, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § (g), 132 Cong. Rec. E902 (daily ed. Mar.
20, 1986) (same).
166 S. 179, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 135 Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); S. 1396,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 133 Cong. Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987); S. 361, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987); S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4 (1985).
In a more elaborate fashion, another bill states, "No award of damages or assessment of
civil penalties shall be made under any portion of this Act which is found to violate... the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." S. 2408, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § (r), 132 Cong. Rec.
S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986).
167 Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, GATr Doc. L/6568 (1989),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 68, 84-85, para. 59 (36th Supp. 1990) (parties claiming
exception have burden of proving all conditions of exception); Quantitative Restriction and
Other Non-Tariff Measures, GATT Doc. L/5713, reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 211,
216, para. 23 (31st Supp. 1985) (if party imposing quantitative restriction did not advance
GATT, working hypothesis would be that measure was not in conformity with GATT); Can-
ada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504, reprinted
in BISD, supra note 1, at 140, 164, para. 5.20 (30th Supp. 1984) (parties seeking protection
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III
THE COMPATIBILITY OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
wirh GATT
There are five major questions to consider in determining whether a
private right of action against dumping would violate GATT. First,
would an amendment to the Antidumping Act of 1916 that drastically
changes the Act's prima facie elements be considered "grandfathered leg-
islation" under GATT's Protocol of Provisional Application? 168 Second,
would a private right of action create a remedy that is not sanctioned by
GATT as a permissible response to injurious dumping?169 Third, is a
private right of action employing injunctive relief in violation of GATT
article X's limitation on import prohibitions?170 Fourth, would a pri-
vate right of action violate GATT article III's "national treatment" limi-
tation by substantively and procedurally treating imports less favorably
than products of national origin?1 71 Fifth, in the event that such a pri-
vate right of action does violate GATT, would it nevertheless be allowed
within the general exception of article XX(d)? 172 Analysis of these cen-
tral issues will lead to an accurate conclusion as to the compatibility of
these proposals with the General Agreement.
A. The Protocol of Provisional Application
One reason Congress has proposed amending the Antidumping Act
of 1916 to provide a private right of action is that such a provision may
circumvent GATT by being "grandfathered in." The Antidumping Act
of 1916 is permissible under GATT despite its inconsistencies with the
General Agreement 173 because it is considered "existing legislation"
within the meaning of GATT's Protocol of Provisional Application.1 74
Many lawmakers and international trade lawyers have assumed that the
proposed amendments to the Act will share in this grandfather protec-
under GATr exception must demonstrate they have met all conditions of exception).
168 See Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note 29 (contracting parties undertake to
apply provisionally Part II of GATT to fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legisla-
tion); text accompanying notes 173-242 infra.
169 See GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 2; text accompanying notes 243-63 infra.
170 See GAIT, supra note 1, art. XI, para. 1; text accompanying notes 264-77 infra.
171 See GATT, supra note 1, art. III; text accompanying notes 278-339 infra.
172 See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d); text accompanying notes 340-84 infra.
173 For a discussion of how the Act is inconsistent with GAIT, see text accompanying
notes 218-22 infra.
174 For a law to be considered "existing legislation" under the Protocol, it must be legisla-
tion in a formal sense, predate the Protocol, and be mandatory in character by its terms or
expressed intent. See Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, GATr' Doc. L/
6474 (1989), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 306, 320, para. 5.6-5.7 (36th Supp. 1990). The
Antidumping Act of 1916 fulfills these requirements.
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tion.175 But this assumption is questionable under GATT law.
1. GA Ti Law on "Grandfather Rights"
By interpreting GATT narrowly, one could conclude that any
change to preexisting legislation, even to statutory form, nullifies that
legislation's grandfather protection. This, however, is not the interpreta-
tion given to the Protocol by the GATT Dispute Panels.1 76 In its Brazil-
ian Internal Taxes decision, 177 the panel's conclusions178 were based on
the assumption that the mere fact of amendment does not undermine the
legality of grandfathered laws under the Protocol. 179 Likewise, in United
States Manufacturing Clause,180 the panel noted that merely amending a
statute does not necessarily disqualify it as "existing legislation." 1 81
Rather the crucial question is whether the substance of a change under-
mines the law's compliance with GAiT.
18 2
More specifically, the proper query is whether the amendment in-
creases the statute's inconsistency with GATT18 3 As noted in United
States Manufacturing Clause, "changes to the [statute] that [do] not alter
its degree of inconsistency with the General Agreement, or which consti-
tute[ ] a move towards a greater degree of consistency, [do] not cause it
to cease to qualify as 'existing legislation' . .. [under] the Protocol of
175 See, e.g., 131 Cong. Rec. S478 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1985) (letter from Peter Ehrenhaft,
Partner, Hughes Hubbard & Reed) (Antidumping Act of 1916 enjoys grandfather protection;
amendments now proposed are continuation of that statute and embraced by Protocol); Alm-
stedt, supra note 22, at 779-80 (as to whether amending Act would violate GATT, even assum-
ing remedial relief statutes such as Act would be inconsistent with GATT, United States not
bound because of grandfather protection).
176 GAT disputes are referred to a panel of experts known as the "Dispute Panel." These
experts act in their own capacity and not as representatives of any government. See Under-
standing Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GAT
Doc. L/4907 (1979), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 210, 212-13, paras. 10-14 (26th Supp.
1980); . Jackson, supra note 6, at 63. Dispute Panel Reports are forwarded to the contracting
parties and usually "adopted." See J. Jackson, supra note 6, at 66. Once adopted, the reports
bind the parties to the dispute. As to precedential effect, the reports have at least some persua-
sive authority and may constitute a definitive interpretation of GATT. See id. at 68-69.
177 GATT Doc. CP.3/42 (1949), reprinted in II BISD, supra note 1, at 181 (1951), noted in
Hansen & Vermulst, supra note 22, at 277; see text accompanying notes 192-97 infra.
178 See text accompanying notes 190-97 infra.
179 See Hansen & Vermulst, supra note 22, at 277.
180 GATT Doc. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74 (31st Supp. 1985);
see text accompanying notes 198-213 infra.
181 GATT Doc. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 88-89, para. 36 (31st
Supp. 1985).
182 See id. (GAT could be modified without losing its status of "existing legislation" pro-
vided degree of inconsistency not increased); Hansen & Vermust, supra note 22, at 277
(same).
183 United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doc. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in BISD,
supra note 1, at 74, 88-89, para. 36 (31st Supp. 1985).
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Provisional Application."1'" The implication is that GATT does permit
a "one-way street" in the direction of greater compliance, 8 5 but that
amendments that move a statute away from a greater degree of consis-
tency with GATT are not grandfathered.
18 6
This interpretation is consistent with the basic purpose of the Proto-
col-to enable governments to accept the obligations of the General
Agreement without having to adjust their domestic legislation.18 7 It
would be inconsistent with the purposes of the General Agreement if a
contracting party felt free to reverse at any time the steps previously
taken to bring its legislation into conformity with GATT.188 Therefore,
a contracting party would be unjustified in giving the Protocol "an inter-
pretation that would extend its function beyond those it was originally
designed to serve."18 9 As such, the Protocol must be interpreted to fur-
ther the full application of the General Agreement.
2. Determining Proposed Amendments' Conformity with GA T
What remains to be determined, then, is whether the creation of a
private right of action is a departure from or is consistent with GATT.
Significantly, no definitive standard has been promulgated for determin-
ing if a particular amendment is a movement toward greater consistency
with GATT. One test that has been suggested is a "commercial impact"
test.1 9° Under this approach, an amendment of any preexisting legisla-
tion is not allowed if the "commercial impact of the new law is more
restrictive than the impact of the law which was in effect on October 30,
184 Id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 89, para. 36 (31st Supp. 1985).
185 See id. (concluding that Protocol should be interpreted as opening "one-way street"
permitting only movements toward greater consistency with GATT), reprinted in BISD, supra
note 1, at 74, 90, paras. 38-39 (31st Supp. 1985); see also Norway-Restrictions on Imports of
Apples and Pears, GATT Doc. L/6474 (1989), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 306, 320,
para. 5.6 (36th Supp. 1990).
186 United States Manufacturing Clause, GAIT Doc. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in BISD,
supra note 1, at 74, 89-90, paras. 37, 39 (31st Supp. 1985). The Panel also noted that amend-
ments leading to a greater inconsistency with GATT are not justified even if the resulting
degree of inconsistency is less than that which existed in the statute at the time of GATTs
formation. Thus, if an amendment already had moved legislation two steps toward GAT, a
later amendment moving the legislation one step back would be disallowed even though the net
effect of both amendments is one step forward. See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74,
90, para. 39 (31st Supp. 1985).
187 See Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, GAIT Doc. L/6474 (1989),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 306, 319, para. 5.5 (36th Supp. 1990); text accompanying
notes 28-30 supra.
188 See Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, GAT Doc. L/6474 (1989)
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 306, 320 para. 5.6 (36th Supp. 1990).
189 Id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 306, 319 para. 5.5 (36th Supp. 1990).
190 See Brazilian Internal Taxes, GATT/CP.3/42 (1949), reprinted in II BISD, supra note
1, at 181, 184 para. 13 (1951).
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1947."191 The first attempt to use this test occurred in Brazilian Internal
Taxes.192 There, the Brazilian government enjoyed a protection under
the Protocol for certain liqueur taxes. Domestic liqueurs were taxed
three cruzeiros while imported liqueurs were taxed six cruzeiros. 193 The
dispute arose when Brazil increased both taxes but maintained the pro-
portional relationship. 194 Brazil, using the commercial impact test, ar-
gued that "unless it could be shown that the effect of the law.., had
been to increase the protection of the national product, the law could not
be held to be incompatible with [the relevant provisions of GATT]. '' 195
The opposing contracting party (France) argued that the absolute, not
the proportional, difference in the taxes mattered. 196 However, the con-
ffict was not resolved, and neither approach was adopted. 19
7
More recently in United States Manufacturing Clause,198 however,
the panel adopted an alternative to the "commercial impact" test. The
statute at issue there, the "Manufacturing Clause," 199 prohibited the im-
portation of certain literary materials into the United States2° unless the
materials were manufactured in the United States or Canada. 20 1 In 1976,
an amendment to the statute provided that the Manufacturing Clause
would expire on July 1, 1982.202 In 1982, however, Congress extended
191 Hansen & Vermulst, supra note 22, at 279.
192 GATT/CP.3/42 (1949), reprinted in II BISD, supra note 1, at 181 (1951).
193 Id., reprinted in II BISD, supra note 1, at 181, 184 para. 12 (1951). This protection was
a clear violation of the "national treatment" requirement of article III because it treated im-
ported products less favorably than domestic products.
194 The increase was from three to 18 cruzeiros for domestic liqueurs, and from six to 36
cruzeiros for imported liqueurs. See id.
195 Id. (emphasis added); see Hansen & Vermulst, supra note 22, at 279.
196 Thus, if the domestic tax was increased to 18 cruzeiros, the imported tax could be in-
creased only to 21 cruzeiros, maintaining the absolute difference between the taxes. Brazilian
Internal Taxes, GAIT/CP.3/42 (1949), reprinted in II BISD, supra note 1, at 181, 184 para.
12 (1951).
197 The Panel's failure to decide this dispute was symptomatic of the early inadequacies of
the GATT Dispute Panel decisionmaking process. At the time, the Panel did not resolve the
legal dispute before it, rather it simply catalogued the issues. See R. Hudec, The GATT Legal
System and World Trade Diplomacy 111 (1975). One commentator, however, states that the
Brazilian Internal Taxes Panel implicitly adopted France's "absolute differential" interpreta-
tion. See K. Dam, supra note 25, at 121 (Panel's rejection of Brazilian interpretation estab-
lishes precedent of sorts for absolute differential interpretation).
198 GAT Doc. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74 (31st Supp. 1985).
199 17 U.S.C. § 601-603 (1988).
200 Specifically, it prohibits the importation or distribution of a copyrighted work consisting
primarily of nondramatic literary material in the English language when the author is a United
States domiciliary. See United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doc. L/5609 (1984), re-
printed in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 76 para. 4 (31st Supp. 1985).
201 See id. This law violates article XI's restrictions on import prohibitions. See id., re-
printed in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 88 para. 34 (31st Supp. 1985). The United States is
permitted to apply the law because it qualifies as "existing legislation" under the Protocol. See
id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 88-89 paras. 35-36 (31st Supp. 1985).
202 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 76 para. 6 (31st Supp. 1985).
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the expiration date by four years.20 3
The European Communities claimed that this extension was not
covered by the Protocol of Provisional Application 2°4 because it violated
the other contracting parties' "reasonable expectations" that the Manu-
facturing Clause would no longer be applied after the original expiration
date.20 5 The GATT Dispute Panel accepted their "reasonable expecta-
tions" argument,20 6 reasoning that an amendment can be made only if it
leads to greater consistency with GATT, and whether an amendment is a
movement toward greater consistency must be determined by the reason-
able expectations of the contracting parties.207 "[T]he Panel found that
the European Communities had been justified in reaching the conclusion
that the expir[ation] date" of July 1, 1982 had represented a move toward
greater GATT conformity.20 8 As a consequence, the panel found that
the 1982 postponement of the expiration date by four years "constituted
a reversal of this move towards greater GATT conformity and, therefore,
increased the degree of inconsistency with the General Agreement. '2°9
Because a contracting party's expectations must be "reasonable," ul-
timately a proposed amendment's consistency with GATT must be mea-
sured against the purposes underlying the Protocol, the General
Agreement, and GATT's antidumping provisions. Given the choice be-
tween two possible interpretations, the interpretation that remains faith-
ful to these purposes is the appropriate one.210 The Protocol's primary
purpose is to provide a "temporary dispensation to enable contracting
parties to apply.., the General Agreement without changing existing
203 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 77 para. 7 (31st Supp. 1985).
204 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 77 para. 8 (31st Supp. 1985).
205 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 80 para. 17 (31st Supp. 1985). In particu-
lar, the European Communities noted that the United States gave repeated assurances during
the Tokyo Round that the Manufacturing Clause would expire in 1982, eliminating any need
to address concerns about the clause. See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 82-86
paras. 24-29 (31st Supp. 1985).
206 The following discussion of "reasonable expectations" should not be confused with the
"reasonable expectations" approach used by GATT when considering "nullification and im-
pairment" under GATT article XXIII. Under that analysis, nullification and impairment oc-
cur where "reasonable expectations" are frustrated, even though the measures are not
inconsistent with the General Agreement. See Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines,
GATT Doc. G/26 (1952) (Norway had reason to assume that it would not be treated less
favorably by unilateral action of Germany), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 53, 58 para. 16
(1st Supp. 1953); Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, GATTl Doc. CP.4/39 (1950)
(nullification and "impairment would exist if the action of the Australian Government...
could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Chilean Government"), reprinted in II
BISD, supra note 1, at 188, 193-94 para. 12 (1952).
207 See United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doc. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in
BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 89 para. 37 (31st Supp. 1985).
208 Id. (emphasis added).
209 Id.
210 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 90 para. 39 (31st Supp. 1985).
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legislation or acting inconsistently with it,"211 while GATT's purposes
include providing "security and predictability in trade relations among
contracting parties. '2 12 As for antidumping, one of the basic goals of
these provisions is to combat unfair competition by imposing duties that
"level the playing field" 213 among competing nations. Thus any test used
to determine whether an amendment is a movement away from greater
GATT consistency must be faithful to these purposes.
Thus, the standard that most appropriately reflects the GATT law
on amending preexisting legislation is that a contracting party may not
amend its grandfathered legislation in a way that makes the new law
more restrictive than any version of that law in effect since October 30,
1947, when the Protocol opened for signature.214 Whether a law is
"more restrictive" must be determined in light of practice215 and in
accordance with the purposes behind the Protocol and the General
Agreement.
21 6
3. Amendments to the 1916 Act
Under the foregoing analysis, GATT compatibility of the proposed
changes in the Antidumping Act of 1916 varies with the terms of each
particular amendment. A few of the proposed changes are movements
toward greater consistency with GATT, while others are movements to-
ward greater inconsistency. But before discussing the proposed amend-
ments to the Act, it is necessary to discuss how the Act currently is
inconsistent with GATT.2 17 Only then can the proposals be examined
properly.
There are several ways in which the Act arguably is inconsistent
211 Id.; see Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, GATT Doe. L/6474
(1989), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 306, 319 para. 5.5 (36th Supp. 1990).
212 United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doc. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in BISD,
supra note 1, at 74, 90 para. 39 (31st Supp. 1985).
213 See note 65 supra.
214 See Hansen & Vermust, supra note 22, at 283.
215 See id. at 282.
216 See United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doe. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in
BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 90 para. 39. (31st Supp. 1985).
217 Several commentators argue that the Act is not inconsistent with GATT. See, e.g., 1985
Hearing, supra note 19, at 63 (testimony of Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Partner, Hughes Hubbard &
Reed) (no claim ever has been made that any of the provisions of Act contravenes GATT);
1980 Hearing, supra note 21, at 23 (statement of Peter Feller, Attorney, McClure & Trotter,
Charles Verrill, Attorney, Patton, Boggs & Blow, and Gary Horlick, Attorney, Steptoe &
Johnson) (neither Act nor proposed amendments is contrary to United States's obligations in
GATT article VI); id. at 38 (statement of Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Partner, Hughes Hubbard &
Reed) (no claim ever has been made by any foreign government or United States agency that
existing Act contravenes Antidumping Code). If this is so, then the Act would be consistent
with the General Agreement and would not be subject to the Protocol's grandfather clause
protection. See Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note 29.
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with GATT. First, GATT "allows only one remedy against dumping,
that is, the imposition of antidumping duties. '218 Yet the Act resorts to
remedies not contemplated by GATT's article VI, including criminal
penalties. Second, the Act's treble damage and criminal penalty provi-
sions effectively treat imports from dumping nations less favorably than
nonoffending imports of other countries, deviating from the GATT norm
of "Most Favored Nation" treatment. 219 Moreover, products of foreign
origin are treated less favorably than products of domestic origin because
comparable domestic antitrust laws include special intent require-
ments220 and various defenses221 that are absent from the Antidumping
Act of 1916. Finally, because the Antidumping Act of 1916 allows pri-
vate and government interference through the imposition of civil and
criminal penalties, these laws are incongruous with the principle of trade
liberalization22 2 and effectively function as additional nontariff barriers.
The proposed amendments can be measured against this background.
Certain proposals would mark a clear movement away from greater
consistency with GATT. For instance, injunctive relief is not part of the
Antidumping Act of 1916. Given that such a remedy is inconsistent with
article XI's limitations on import prohibitions,223 adding injunctive relief
to the Act would be a movement away from a greater degree of consis-
tency with GATT. Moreover, such a new, inconsistent remedy would
not accord with the accepted practice of the contracting parties and
would not further the Protocol's purpose of providing a "temporary dis-
pensation" to existing legislation.224
More importantly, the proposed amendments which alter the prima
facie elements of the Act 225 would move the statute further away from
GATT compliance. Most of the proposed legislation would require only
a showing of an intent to dump, rather than require proof of a specific
218 Hansen & Vermulst, supra note 22, at 304. But see text accompanying notes 243-63
infra.
219 For a discussion of this principle, see note 44 and accompanying text supra. Specifically,
this treatment is a violation of article I. See GATT, supra note 1, art. I; cf. A. Lowenfeld,
supra note 2, at 155 (traditional dumping remedies are deviation from principle of
nondiscrimination).
220 For example, under the predatory pricing laws of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1988), "there must be a showing of specific intent to monopolize a relevant market." Apple-
baum & Grace, U.S. Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 56 Antitrust L.J. 497, 512-13 (1987).
221 The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988), includes defenses of cost justifica-
tion, meeting competition, and marketability factors. See notes 300-02 and accompanying text
infra.
222 See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
223 See text accompanying notes 264-77 infra.
224 See text accompanying note 211 supra.
225 See text accompanying notes 148-57 supra.
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intent to injure competition or monopolize.226 Furthermore, these bills
would reduce the dumping differential from "a price substantially less"
to "a price less" than that of the country of origin.227 Finally, most of
the bills would eliminate the requirement that the dumped item be "com-
monly and systematically" imported.228
Substantially altering the prima facie elements would transform the
Act from a "dead letter" 229 into an effective means to remedy dumping.
Thus, these proposals would violate the "commercial impact" test by
changing the current trade environment from one in which foreign
dumpers are not subject in practice to any liability230 to one in which
they are exposed to a significant amount of liability.
231
Under a "reasonable expectations" analysis, altering the elements of
the Act likewise would be viewed as a movement away from GATT" con-
sistency. Currently, only the United States provides a private right of
action to redress foreign dumping.232 A newly empowered Antidumping
Act of 1916 with a reduced intent requirement likely would be intolera-
ble to the other contracting parties who have resorted to the traditional
remedy of imposing a duty equal to the margin of dumping.233
Finally, altering the Act's elements would not be in accordance with
the purposes of the Protocol or the General Agreement. Conceived as
only a temporary dispensation,234 the Protocol would be used as a means
to reawaken a dead law that, in effect, would be a replacement for, or an
addition to, the currently sanctioned remedy for dumping-a duty equal
to the margin of dumping. Contracting parties cannot manipulate their
"grandfathered rights" by extending the use of the Protocol beyond the
functions it was originally designed to serve.235 Furthermore, GATT's
goal of providing predictability and security in trading relations would
226 See text accompanying notes 149-51 supra; note 151 supra.
227 See text accompanying notes 156-57 supra.
228 See text accompanying notes 154-55 supra.
229 See text accompanying note 126 supra.
230 See text accompanying notes 121-26 supra.
231 See Hansen & Vermulst, supra note 22, at 279.
232 See Bellis, The EEC Antidumping System, in Antidumping Law and Practice: A Com-
parative Study 41, 44-68 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds. 1989); Magnus, The Canadian An-
tidumping System, in Antidumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study 167, 181-92 (J.
Jackson & E. Vermulst eds. 1989); Steele, The Australian Antidumping System, in Antidump-
ing Law and Practice: A Comparative Study 223, 231-50 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds.
1989).
233 See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 27 (testimony of Alan Holmer, General Counsel,
United States Trade Representative) ("[W]e should think twice before we expose our exporters
... to the risk of embargoes or extra antidumping penalties. I suspect our trading partners
would be happy to match us dollar for dollar and injunction for injunction.").
234 See text accompanying notes 28-29, 211 supra.
235 See Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, GATT Doc. L/6474 (1989),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 306, 319 para. 5.5 (36th Supp. 1990).
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not be advanced by these proposals. Using the Protocol as a vehicle to
change the Act's elements would create insecurity among trading parties
because the same margin of dumping by foreign industries in any other
nation would result in an antidumping duty, while dumping in the
United States would subject the foreign industry to protracted litigation
with an American industry seeking monetary compensation in addition
to administrative relief.
In defense of the proposed amendments, it can be argued that cer-
tain provisions would move the Antidumping Act of 1916 closer to
GATT.236 By itself, an amendment that both would reduce the civil pen-
alty from treble to single damages237 and would eliminate the criminal
penalty from the Act 238 would be a movement toward greater consis-
tency with GATT. These changes would further the purposes of the
General Agreement by ensuring predictability and security in trading re-
lations239 and would parallel the general purpose of antidumping laws by
leveling the playing field.24° The current GATT remedy for injurious
dumping is a duty equal to the margin of dumping241 and a damage re-
duction to a level parallel to the margin of dumping would be a move-
ment toward greater consistency. But to argue that such changes alone
would result in a move closer to GATT fails to recognize that such provi-
sions only appear in proposals that also radically depart from GATT,
such as easing the prima facie elements of the Act.242
The various proposals for altering the elements of the Antidumping
Act of 1916 would fail to pass the "commercial impact" test, would not
advance the aims of the Protocol or the General Agreement, and would
undermine the "reasonable expectations" of the United States's trading
partners. For these reasons, substantially altering the prima facie ele-
ments of the Antidumping Act of 1916 would be a movement away from
a greater consistency with GATT. The proposed amendments herefore
would not be protected as "grandfathered legislation" under the Proto-
236 See, e.g., 1983 Hearing, supra note 21, at 65-66 (testimony of Richard 0. Cunningham,
Partner, Steptoe & Johnson) ("Surely our trading partners would not argue that a reduction in
the recoverable damage is such a change in the 1916 Act as to make it more detrimental to
their trading interests.").
237 See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
238 See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
239 See United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doe. L/5609 (1989), reprinted in
BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 90 para. 39 (3 1st Supp. 1985) (basic aim of General Agreement is
security and predictability in trade relations). In particular, the availability of treble damages
or criminal penalties in only one nation undermines the security in trading relations among all
parties. Eliminating these remedies would further the purposes of predictability and security
by creating greater uniformity in application of antidumping laws among contracting parties.
240 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 217-18.
241 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
242 See 15 U.S.C. § 72; notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra.
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col. This Note now examines the specific hurdles that a private right of
action must clear to be consistent with GATT.
B. Article VI and Antidumping Duties
GATT article VI, which contains the remedy provision for dump-
ing, states that "to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may
levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in
amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product. ' 243 One
of the fundamental questions that must be addressed before attempting
to fashion a private right of action that complies with GATT is whether
article VI provides the exclusive remedy for dumping. The congressional
hearings on the proposed bills are replete with references to the article VI
antidumping duty as the only permissible remedy to counteract dump-
ing.244 Article VI's limitation on the use of a duty equal to the margin of
dumping is reinforced by the Antidumping Code of 1979, which states
that "[n]o specific action against dumping of exports from another Party
can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of the General
Agreement, as interpreted by this Agreement." 245 This language implies
that GATT contains all available remedies for dumping. Still, simple
reliance on the ordinary meaning of article VI of GATT fails to resolve
the question. Article VI merely states that a contracting party "may levy
on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty,"246 leaving doubt as to
whether it simply provides a remedy to counteract dumping or the rem-
edy against dumping. Because the language of the General Agreement is
ambiguous, an examination of the preparatory work, context, and pur-
pose of the provision is necessary to aid in its interpretation.247
243 GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 2. For a discussion of the GATT antidumping
scheme, see text accompanying notes 82-95 supra.
244 See, e.g., 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 23 (statement of Sen. Heinz) (some argue that
dumping duties are only remedy for dumping); id. at 214 (testimony of Charlene Barshefsky,
Partner, Steptoe & Johnson) (duties are exclusive remedy); see also Fourth Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Court, 112 F.R.D. 439, 545
(1986) (statement of Charlene Barshefsky, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson) (GATT provides that
no measures other than antidumping duties can be applied to offset dumping); Hansen &
Vermulst, supra note 22, at 304 (GATT allows only one remedy against dumping, an an-
tidumping duty).
245 Antidumping Code of 1979, supra note 90, art. 16, para. 1.
246 GAT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 2 (emphasis added).
247 This approach is analogous to the general method of treaty interpretation under articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United
States has signed, but not ratified, the Vienna Convention.
Preparatory work, or travauxpriparatores, refers to the background materials utilized to
afford useful evidence regarding the intentions of the parties. See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties 116, 141 (2d ed. 1984). Recourse may be had to preparatory
work of a treaty to confirm its meaning when a good faith interpretation of the ordinary mean-
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The preparatory work of GATT is somewhat ambiguous regarding
whether measures other than a duty may be used to counteract injurious
dumping. During the drafting of article VI, one delegate proposed ad-
ding the words "and measures" after the term "antidumping duty." 248
Another delegate argued that quotas should be allowed in certain cases
of dumping.249 But these measures failed to receive approval and were
not incorporated into article VI, suggesting that the delegates intended to
exclude other countermeasures against dumping. Still, it is apparent that
some countries felt that remedies for dumping "should not be limited to
duties as such but should permit the adoption of other counter
measures." 25
0
Any confusion caused by this conflicting evidence is lessened by the
context of article VI, which makes clear that measures other than duties
are permissible to counteract dumping. According to a 1948 report,251
ing of the text is ambiguous or obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result.
See Vienna Convention, supra, art. 32. The context of a treaty comprises, in addition to the
text, any agreement relating to the treaty made among all parties in connection with its conclu-
sion and any instrument made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. See id. art.
31(2). It is in light of the object or purpose of the treaty that the initial conclusions as to the
ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context are tested and confirmed. See I.
Sinclair, supra, at 130. Under the Vienna Convention, "a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention, supra, art. 310) (em-
phasis added). Thus, the object and purpose are not independent elements, but part of the
process of determining the context. See L. Henkin, R. Pugh, 0. Schachter & H. Smit, Interna-
tional Law: Cases and Materials 446 (2d ed. 1987).
248 See Preparatory Comm. of the International Conference on Trade and Employment at
12, U.N. Doe. E/PC/T/C.II/54 (1946).
249 See Report of the Drafting Comm. of the Preparatory Comm. of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment at 13, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34/Rev. 1 (1947), U.N.
Sales No. 1947.11.3 (quantitative restrictions should be allowed in cases of aggravated or spo-
radic dumping); Preparatory Comm. of the International Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment at 12, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54 (1946) (same). In 1955, New Zealand proposed
allowing the use of quantitative restrictions instead of antidumping duties in certain circum-
stances. This proposal was rejected, presumably as contrary to the basic principles of GATT.
See Other Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. L/334 (1955), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at
222, 223 para. 7 (3d Supp. 1955).
250 Preparatory Comm. of the International Conference on Trade and Employment at 11,
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54 (1946). Of the 23 nations that negotiated GATT, five expressed a
desire to permit remedies other than duties to offset dumping. See Drafting Comm. of the
Preparatory Comm. of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment at 17, U.N.
Doe. E/PC/T/C.6/55 (1947) (The five are Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, the Netherlands,
and New Zealand).
251 Reports of Comm. and Principal Sub-Comms., U.N. Doc. ICITO 1/8 (1948). This doc-
ument was drafted at the conclusion of the Havana negotiations for the formation of the Inter-
national Trade Organization. Documents from the Havana conferences have been used
frequently as a means of interpreting GAIT. See, e.g., Japan-Restrictions on Imports of
Certain Agricultural Products, GATT Doc. L/6253 (1988), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1,
at 163, 222 para. 5.1.2 (35th Supp. 1989); Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Alco-
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the committee responsible for the drafting of the antidumping article
agreed to delete a portion of an earlier draft which would have prohibited
the use of measures other than antidumping duties.252 It made this de-
letion with the "definite understanding that measures other than com-
pensatory anti-dumping ...duties may not be applied to counteract
dumping... except in so far as such other measures are permitted under
other provisions of the charter." 253 From this background, it can be ar-
gued that article VI contains an exception to GATT obligations for an-
tidumping duties. Nevertheless, alternative measures also can be used to
counteract dumping provided they do not violate other GATT
provisions.25
4
But even if other remedies are available, there remains a critical dif-
ference. Because article VI is a permitted exception within GAIT,255
duties levied pursuant to it comply with all of GATT's provisions. How-
ever, if a country intends to use other types of measures to counteract
dumping, these measures must comply fully with the General Agree-
ment.256 For example, if a product is being dumped in a particular coun-
try, and tariffs on that product are not bound in a GATT Schedule, 257
the tariffs arguably could be raised without limitation in counteracting
dumping,258 provided that the tariffs were applied on a "Most Favored
Nation" basis.259 But a country could not impose quantitative restric-
tions because that would violate article XI.26° The focus shifts beyond
holic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, GATT Doc. L/6304 (1988), re-
printed in BISD, supra note 1, at 37, 86 para. 4.9 (35th Supp. 1989); Special Import Taxes
Instituted by Greece, GATT Doc. G/25 (1952), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 48, 49-50
para. 6 (1st Supp. 1953); J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 45-46. Accordingly, this
Note treats documents drafted pursuant to the Havana conferences as part of GATT's context.
252 See Reports of Comm. and Principal Sub-Comms. at 74, U.N. Doc. ICITO 1/8 (1948).
The relevant portion of the earlier draft stated, "No measures other than anti-dumping...
duties shall be applied by any member in respect of any product of any other Member country
for the purpose of offsetting dumping." Report of Second Session of the Preparatory Comm.
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment at 31, U.N. Doe. E/PC/T/186
(1947), U.N. Sales No. 1947.11.4.
253 Report of Comms. and Principal Sub-Comms. at 74, U.N. Doc. ICITO 1/8 (1948); see
GATT Doc. CP.2/22/Rev. 1 (1948), reprinted in II BISD, supra note 1, at 39, 41 para. 12
(1952).
254 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 411.
255 See id. at 403.
256 See id. at 411.
257 If a product is "bound" in a GATT "Schedule," the contracting party has made a com-
mitment to levy no more than a stated tariff on that particular item. See id. at 201.
258 See id. at 411-12 (citing Swedish Antidumping Duties, GATT Doc. L/328 (1955), re-
printed in BISD, supra note 1, at 81 (3d Supp. 1955)).
259 See id. at 412; Interview with Andreas Lowenfeld, Professor of Law, New York Univer-
sity School of Law, in New York City (April 13, 1990). For a discussion of the Most Favored
Nation principle, see note 44 and accompanying text supra.
260 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 412 n.4.
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article VI to include the other provisions of GATT as well.26 1
The Antidumping Code of 1979 suggests a similar reading of
GATT.262 Although article 16 of the Antidumping Code intimates that
an antidumping duty is the only "specific action" permissible to counter-
act dumping, it also states, "This [provision] is not intended to preclude
action under other relevant provisions of the General Agreement, as
appropriate.
'263
While the text of article VI is ambiguous as to whether an an-
tidumping duty is the exclusive remedy to counteract dumping, the con-
text and subsequent interpretations show that article VI permits
alternative measures to counteract dumping provided that such measures
comply with all other provisions of GAIT. Specifically, the 1948 report
and article 16 of the Antidumping Code of 1979 demonstrate that other
measures compatible with GATT also can be used to counteract dump-
ing. Thus, article VI is not a barrier to a private right of action against
dumping, provided that such a remedy is drafted to comply with all
other provisions of GATT.
C. Article XI and Injunctive Relief
Although there is some question as to whether a private right of
action for damages is permissible under article VI of GATT, granting
injunctive relief clearly is not allowable under the General Agreement.
Such relief would violate article XI by imposing a prohibition against the
importation of a particular product, which is recognized widely by both
opponents and proponents of a private right of action.26
4
With few exceptions, the General Agreement does not allow import
prohibitions.265 Under article XI, "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other
261 This restriction also alleviates some of the concern about an antidumping "free-for-all,"
in which a government would be free to use any means that it chooses to punish dumping,
including imprisonment. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 32 (testimony of Alan F.
Holmer, General Counsel Office of United States Trade Representative).
262 See Antidumping Code of 1979, supra note 90, art. 16 n.1.
263 Id. art. 16 n.16.
264 See Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 112 F.R.D. 439, 546 (1986) (statement of Charlene Barshefsky, Partner,
Steptoe & Johnson) (injunction as primary form of relief violates GATT); 1986 Hearing, supra
note 12, at 187 (statement of Rep. Guarini) (injunctive relief invites charges of GATT viola-
tion); 1985 Hearing, supra note 19, at 53 (testimony of Richard 0. Cunningham, Partner,
Steptoe & Johnson) (shifting emphasis from damages to injunctive relief jeopardizes GATr
legality).
265 Exceptions are made for critical shortages of foodstuffs, agricultural and fisheries prod-
ucts under certain conditions, and prohibitions necessary to the application of standards or
regulations for the classification, grading, or marketing of commodities. See GAT, supra
note 1, art. XI, para. 2; see also A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 25 (quotas inapplicable to
agricultural products subject to price-support scheme). Other articles of GATT provide ex-
ceptions for balance of payments problems and exceptions for developing countries. See
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than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quo-
tas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product
of the territory of any other contracting party. ' 266 The fact that injunc-
tive relief is incompatible with article XI follows from the GATT Dis-
pute Panel's decision striking down a United States prohibition on
Canadian tuna imports.267 In 1979, the United States prohibited all tuna
imports from Canada. 268 This prohibition was comprehensive, excluding
the imports of all tuna and tuna products from Canada. 269 The Dispute
Panel held that this was a clear violation of article XI.270 It found that
the United States's decision "prohibit[ing] with immediate effect the en-
try for consumption... of tuna and tuna products from Canada consti-
tuted a prohibition in terms of Article XI:I."271  Injunctive relief
essentially has the same impermissible effects. It thus would be contrary
to article XI.
This conclusion is bolstered by the decision in United States Manu-
facturing Clause.272 Recall that the statute at issue in that decision pro-
hibited the importation of certain literary materials unless they had been
manufactured in the United States or Canada. 273 That the statute also
GATT, supra note 1, art. XII (balance of payments); id. art. XVIII (developing countries); K.
Dam, supra note 25, at 20-21 (exceptions for balance of payments and to further economic
development); J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 129 (quotas made inapplica-
ble in case of serious balance of payments difficulties); A. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 26
(same). For a discussion of the policies underlying the general disfavor for quotas, see J.
Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 312-13; J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note
2, at 116.
266 GAIT, supra note 1, art. XI, para. 1. Unlike other provisions of GATT, article XI does
not refer to laws or regulations but refers instead to measures. See Japan-Trade in Semi-
Conductors, GATT Doe. L/6309 (1988), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 116, 153-54 (35th
Supp. 1989). This reference implies that any measure instituted or maintained by a con-
tracting party that restricts the importation of any foreign product is covered by its terms. See
id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 116, 154 (35th Supp. 1989). This broad interpretation
is consistent with one of the aims of article XI: protecting the contracting parties' expectations
that competitive conditions exist in trading relations. See EEC-Restrictions on Imports of
Apples-Complaint by the U.S., GATT Doc. L/6513 (1989) (article XI protects expectations
of contracting parties as to competitive conditions, not trade volumes), reprinted in BISD,
supra note 1, at 135, 167 para. 5.25 (36th Supp. 1990).
267 United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada,
GATT Doe. L/5198 (1982), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 91 (29th Supp. 1983).
268 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 91, 92 (29th Supp. 1983).
269 See id.
270 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 91, 107 (29th Supp. 1983).
271 Id. For a similar finding with respect to export prohibitions, see Canada-Measures
Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATr Doc. L/6268 (1988) (export
prohibitions are contrary to article XI), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 98, 111-12 para.
4.1 (35th Supp. 1989).
272 See United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doe. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in
BISD, supra note 1, at 74 (31st Supp. 1985); text accompanying notes 198-209 supra.
273 See United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doe. L/5609 (1984), reprinted in
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violates article XI is evidenced by the treatment it received by the parties
and by the Panel. The United States conceded that it violated article
XI,274 while the Panel, in an extremely brief discussion, likewise found
this prohibition of imports to be inconsistent with article XI.275
The ineluctable conclusion drawn from the language of subsequent
interpretations of article XI is that injunctive relief, either as a primary
or secondary remedy, would violate GATT. This conclusion therefore
calls into question many of the proposed bills that provide for such re-
lief.276 The United States thus has the obligation to prevent the imple-
mentation of such import prohibitions. 277 In sum, it is clear that the
proposed private right of action violates article XI of GATT. However,
it is less clear whether the proposals run afoul of article III's requirement
of national treatment.
D. Article III and National Treatment
GATT article III requires that contracting parties treat imported
products "no less favourabl[y] than that [treatment] accorded to like
products of national origin" with respect to all laws, regulations, and
requirements affecting their internal sale, purchase, distribution, or
use.278 Thus, any law that treats foreign products less favorably than
domestic products violates GATT. One of the major goals of the na-
tional treatment provision is to prevent domestic taxes and regulatory
schemes from being used as protectionist measures that would defeat the
purpose of the tariff agreements. 279 Article III seeks to provide equal
conditions of competition once goods clear customs, thereby protecting
the benefits accruing from tariff concessions. 280 Thus, its fundamental
BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 76 (31st Supp. 1985).
274 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 74, 78 (31st Supp. 1985).
275 See id. ("[Tjhe prohibition of imports of certain printed matter provided for in the Man-
ufacturing Clause [is] inconsistent with paragraph 1 of Article XI."), reprinted in BISD, supra
note 1, at 74, 88 (31st Supp. 1985).
276 See text accompanying notes 161-62 supra.
277 Cf. Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, GATT Doc. L/5713
(1984) (governments maintaining quantitative restrictions inconsistent with GATT have obli-
gation to eliminate quantitative restrictions in question), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at
211, 219 (31st Supp. 1985).
278 GATI', supra note 1, art. III, para. 4.
279 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 189; see also J. Jackson, World
Trade, supra note 2, at 277 (purposes of national treatment article include prevention of use of
regulations as system of protection and protection of tariff concessions).
280 Japan--Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alco-
holic Beverages, GATT Doe. L/6216 (1987), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 83, 114 para.
5.5(c) (34th Supp. 1988); see also United States--Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT
Doc. L/6439 (1989) (article III expresses principle of equality of treatment of imported prod-
ucts as compared to treatment given domestic products), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at
345, 386 para. 5.11 (36th Supp. 1990).
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philosophy is to ensure a certain trade neutrality 281 and to reinforce trade
liberalization through the minimization of governmental interference and
distortion of international transactions. 282
The language of article III is broad in scope, governing any laws,
regulations, and requirements affecting the sale, purchase, transporta-
tion, distribution, or use of products.2s 3 It uses the word "affecting,"
implying that article III covers not only the laws and regulations that
directly govern the conditions of sale or purchase, but also any laws or
regulations that might modify adversely the conditions of competition
between domestic and imported products in internal markets.28 The
question of fidelity to the national treatment principle therefore must fo-
cus both on laws affecting imports directly and on the procedural ele-
ments of those laws that operate unfairly.
L Substantive Import Discrimination
Granting a private right of action for dumping could run afoul of
article III by treating actions that would be permissible if practiced by a
domestic party as illegal if practiced by a foreign party. That is, "the
same conduct by two firms, one domestic and one foreign, could be
deemed unfair competition subject to treble damages in the case of the
foreign firm, and not punishable at all in the case of the domestic
firm. '285 Therefore, for a private right of action to comply with GATT,
the national treatment test somehow must be met.
286
One means by which the national treatment obligation of article III
281 Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alco-
holic Beverages, GATT Doc. L/6216 (1987) (quoting Border Tax Adjustments, GATT Doc.
L/3464 (1970), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 97, 99 para. 9 (18th Supp. 1972)), reprinted
in BISD, supra note 1, at 83, 114 para. 5.5(c) (34th Supp. 1988).
282 See J. Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 4, at 483.
283 See GATT, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1.
284 Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, GATF Doc. L/833
(1958), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 60, 64 para. 12 (7th Supp. 1959); see also Canada-
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504 (1984) (article
III:4 not limited to "laws" and "regulations" in sense of mandatory rules applying across-the-
board), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 140, 159 para. 5.5 (30th Supp. 1984).
285 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 31 (statement of Alan F. Holmer, General Counsel,
Office of the United States Trade Representative).
286 See id. at 54 (amendments must show that foreign firms and their products are on equal
footing with United States firms and their products in accordance with article III of GATT);
1985 Hearing, supra note 19, at 63 (testimony of Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Partner, Hughes Hub-
bard & Reed) (amendments should not breach article III to extent that it parallels comparable
domestic law); 1980 Hearing, supra note 21, at 106 (testimony of Seymour Rubin, Member of
Board of Directors, Consumers for World Trade) ("[S]ubject[ing] imported products to treat-
ment especially reserved for such products and not equally applicable to products of national
origin would see[m], on any reasonable reading, to conflict with the requirement of Article
111(4) of the GATT.... ."); Almstedt, supra note 22, at 780 (amendments to Act contravene
national treatment test).
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can be met while still providing a private right of action against dumping
is to structure the right so that it is analogous to some currently existing
domestic remedy for price discrimination or predation. 287 The most ap-
parent analogue is the Robinson-Patman Act,28 8 which has been noted
both by scholars289 and by congressional proponents of the bills.
29
0
Among the available Robinson-Patman remedies, the so-called "primary
line" test is the domestic price discrimination law most closely parallel-
ing the proposed remedies. Under the "primary line" 291 test, it is unlaw-
ful for a seller to discriminate in the price charged to purchasers of like
commodities where the effect may be to injure, destroy, or prevent com-
petition.292 Thus, price discrimination that has the effect of driving com-
petitors out of the market is prohibited.
293
To distinguish between permissible vigorous price competition and
prohibited price predation, courts use several differing approaches.
294
287 See 1980 Hearing, supra note 21, at 39 (letter from Peter Ehrenhaft, Partner, Hughes
Hubbard & Reed).
288 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). The Robinson-Patman Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved
in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, con-
sumption, or resale within the United States... and where the effect of such discrimina-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination ....
Id.
289 One proponent of a private right of action has argued, "he creation of a remedy ad-
dressed to imported goods causing injury to competition... should not breach [the national
treatment test] to the extent that it parallels comparable domestic law. Mere extension of the
Robinson-Patman Act to international trade would be one way to achieve that result." 1980
Hearing, supra note 21, at 39 (letter from Peter Ehrenhaft, Partner, Hughes Hubbard & Reed).
But see R. Dale, Anti-dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order 46 (1980) (Robinson-Patman
inappropriate as model to be applied to international price discrimination).
290 See S. 223, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1979); see also 1980 Hearing, supra note 21, at
23 n.1 (testimony of Peter Feller, McClure & Trotter, Charles Verrill, Patten, Boggs & Blow,
and Gary Horlick, Steptoe & Johnson) (S. 223 effectively would make Robinson-Patman Act
applicable to imports).
291 By "primary line" injury, courts refer to injury experienced by competitors of the seller.
See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967) (primary line cases
involve sellers' markets); E. Sullivan & J. Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and Its Eco-
nomic Implications 308 (1988) (primary line cases concern discrimination injuring seller's
competitors). It also may be described as "horizontal competitive effects." L. Sullivan, Hand-
book of the Law of Antitrust 683-89 (1977).
292 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a); L. Sullivan, supra note 291, at 677.
293 See L. Sullivan, supra note 291, at 683; see also E. Sullivan & J. Harrison, supra note
291, at 323 (harm may be shown by evidence of competitive injury or of predatory intent).
294 Although a complete synchronization between the tests for price predation under
Robinson-Patman and the same tests under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, does not
exist, several circuits have indicated that the analysis for each is essentially the same. See P.
Areeda & L. Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases 942 (1988); E. Fox & L.
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Some focus on predatory intent as a means of inferring anticompetitive
eftects;2 95 others focus on sales below COSt;2 9 6 while still others focus on
the potential for future monopolization and the likelihood of recoup-
ment. 297 Regardless of the focus, courts in general look to several factors
Sullivan, Cases and Materials on Antitrust 211-14 (1989). For cases treating the two inquiries
as essentially the same, see, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d
1396, 1399-1400 (7th Cir. 1989) (Robinson-Patman claim of predatory pricing has much in
common with contention that defendant engaged in predatory pricing in violation of § 2 of
Sherman Act), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); D.E. Rogers Assocs., Inc. v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1439 (6th Cir. 1983) (proof of anticompetitive intent under Robin-
son-Patman is no different from that under Sherman Act), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984);
0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 1981) (concept of predation under
Robinson-Patman does not differ from Sherman Act concept of predation), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1017 (1982).
295 See, e.g., Utah Pie Co., 386 U.S. at 702 (existence of predatory intent might bear on
likelihood of injury to competition); McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487,
1500 (11th Cir. 1988) (subjective intent relevant to determine predatory pricing); D.E. Rogers,
718 F.2d at 1439 (Robinson-Patman Act plaintiff may prove anticompetitive effect inferen-
tially from proof of defendant's anticompetitive intent); 0. Hommel Co., 659 F.2d at 347 (anal-
ysis must focus on predatory intent to infer competitive harm).
Many courts, however, strongly disfavor reliance on intent as a basis of determining pred-
atory pricing. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402 (intent removed as basis of
liability in predatory pricing cases (citing P. Areeda, 7 Antitrust Law 1506 (1986))); Barry
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) ("intent to harm" is too
vague); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1113 (7th
Cir.) (test based on intent unworkable), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
296 See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp., 724 F.2d at 236 (price above incremental and average cost
per se lawful); MCI, 708 F.2d at 1112 (no reliable way to determine whether predatory pricing
has occurred without some comparison between prices charged and cost of production); Han-
son v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1976) (pricing below marginal or average
variable cost fails to establish prima facie case under Sherman Act), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074
(1977); see also Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 733 (1975) (prices at or above marginal cost should be
conclusively presumed nonpredatory). But see Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp.,
698 F.2d 1377, 1388 (9th Cir.) (cost-price relation not exclusive method of proving predation),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Com-
ment, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 890 (1976) ("[lIt is unrealistic and even analytically wrong to
apply a simple short-run price-cost rule for determining whether exclusionary pricing by a
monopolist is socially undesirable and therefore predatory.").
The Supreme Court has defined predatory pricing as "pricing below an appropriate mea-
sure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competi-
tion in the long run." Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986); see also
Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1985) (predatory pric-
ing includes "(i) pricing below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below
some appropriate measure of cost"). But the Court explicitly has refused to consider whether
recovery should ever be available when the pricing in question is above some measure of incre-
mental cost, see Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117 n.12; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.9, or whether
above-cost pricing coupled with predatory intent is ever sufficient to state a claim of predation.
See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 118 n.12.
297 See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1401 (contemporary cases strongly favor using like-
lihood of future recoupment as basis for determining predatory pricing); Indiana Grocery, Inc.
v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1415 (7th Cir. 1989) (reduced likelihood of preda-
tory low price if rivals survive or entry occurs (citing Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and
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when determining whether a "primary line" injury to sellers has oc-
curred. 298 Factors supporting a finding of price discrimination include:
a large market share for the seller; evidence of aggressive stances toward
weaker rivals; deep and sustained undercutting; and the demise of ri-
vals.299 The Robinson-Patman Act allows a defendant to raise the af-
firmative defenses of cost justification,3° meeting competition,301 and
general marketability concerns 30 2 to defeat such a finding.
Under a Robinson-Patman Act analogue, only certain types of inter-
national dumping could be actionable. As a practical matter, dumping
that injures a domestic industry but is either procompetitive or competi-
tively neutral could not be subject to a private remedy.30 3 Though a do-
mestic industry may be injured by dumping, this activity would not be
actionable under a Robinson-Patman analogue as long as competition is
not reduced, trade is not restrained, or a monopoly is not created. 304
Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 959, 965 (1987))); Henry v. Chlo-
ride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1345 (8th Cir. 1987) (to lessen competition under Robinson-Patman,
defendant must be able to create real possibility of holding on to price-cutting advantage to
recoup losses); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589 (success of any predatory pricing scheme
depends on maintaining monopoly power long enough to recoup predator's losses and to har-
vest additional gain). See generally Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,
48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 265-76 (1981) (discussing likelihood of recoupment to make predation
profitable).
298 Overall, the focus of the inquiry into primary line injury is on the probable lessening of
competition-meaning here the creation or increase in market power. Interview with Eleanor
Fox, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, in New York City (May 4, 1990).
299 L. Sullivan, supra note 291, at 688.
300 Price differentials that make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale, or delivery resulting from differing methods or quantities are excepted. 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1988); see United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 467 (1962) (Robinson-Patman
Act contemplates showing of actual cost differences).
301 A seller can rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination by showing that a lower
price or that the furnishing of services or facilities to purchasers was in good faith needed to
meet an equally low price or services of a competitor. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(b); P. Areeda & L.
Kaplow, supra note 294, at 969-79; E. Sullivan & J. Harrison, supra note 291, at 328-30; L.
Sullivan, supra note 291, at 702; Applebaum & Grace, supra note 220, at 509-10.
The meeting competition defense has been interpreted to " 'at least require[ ] the seller...
to show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe
that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor."'
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 451 (1978) (quoting FTC v. A.E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-760 (1945)); see Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.,
460 U.S. 428, 438 (1983); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 82 (1979).
302 Discrimination is allowed where it reflects "changing conditions affecting the market for
or the marketability of the goods concerned." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). This defense, though rarely
used, see E. Sullivan & J. Harrison, supra note 291, at 309, permits distress sales and sales
below normal prices to move obsolete inventory. See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 220, at
510.
303 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (domestic price discrimination only unlawful if effect is to lessen
competition substantially or to tend to create monopoly).
304 This test means that a mere "material injury" standard for dumping would be insuffi-
cient to satisfy article III. "[O]ur antitrust laws concern themselves with substantial injury to
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Moreover, applying a Robinson-Patman Act analogue to interna-
tional dumping would mean that the affirmative, procompetitive defenses
of cost justification, meeting competition, and changing marketability
concerns would be available to defendants. 30 5 An international price dis-
crimination charge thus could be defended on the grounds that the lower
price "was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competi-
tor" 30 6 or that the price reflects due allowance for differences in cost.307
Given this overview of domestic antitrust law, it is clear that the
vast majority of bills proposed by Congress that offer a private right of
action against dumping would not meet the national treatment test be-
cause the bills provide for remedies in instances where competition flour-
ishes. 30s Indeed, only six of the eighteen proposed bills arguably could
meet the national treatment test of article III, because only these six in-
clude in whole309 or in part310 an anticompetitive component to the in-
jury requirement comparable to that of the Robinson-Patman Act. And
only one of these bills includes the Robinson-Patman procompetitive de-
fenses. 311 Clearly then, the majority of the proposed bills would not pass
article III scrutiny on the basis of their substantive content alone. And
even those that might survive such scrutiny contain procedural defects,
rendering them suspect.
2. Procedural Import Discrimination
Article III applies to all laws, regulations, and requirements affect-
ing the internal sale of imported products, thus making no distinction
competition," while many of the proposed bills would permit the punishment of foreign com-
panies where business has been taken away from even a single domestic industry. 1983 Hear-
ing, supra note 21, at 81 (testimony of Joel Davidow, Partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander
& Ferdon). Thus, many proposals illegitimately would permit a civil action where no antitrust
injury has occurred.
305 See 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 932 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S.
1655); 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 165 (same); 1983 Hearing, supra note 21, at 80 (testi-
mony of Joel Davidow, Partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon); see also W. Da-
vey, Antidumping Laws in the GATT and the EC, in Antidumping Law and Practice 295,
297-98 (J. Jackson & E. Vermust eds. 1989) (comparing differences in defenses between
Robinson-Patman Act and antidumping laws for purposes of article III analysis).
306 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 165 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S. 1655); see
note 301 and accompanying text supra.
307 See note 300 and accompanying text supra.
308 See text accompanying notes 158-60 supra. Under Robinson-Patman, only discrimina-
tion that has the effect of substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly is
unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
309 S. 223, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1979); see note 159 supra.
310 S. 1104, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S5616 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1987); H.R.
Rep. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 166-167, 133 Cong. Rec. H2642 (daily ed. Apr. 29,
1987) (amending H.R. 3, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987)); S. 127, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S.
2517, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 938, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
311 S. 223, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1979).
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between substantive and procedural laws.312 Any laws "which might ad-
versely modify the conditions of competition between the domestic and
imported products" fall within its ambit.31 3  To comply fully with
GATT's national treatment requirement, therefore, the procedures under
parallel domestic laws must be compared with the procedures of the pro-
posed private right of action to determine whether imported products are
accorded less favorable treatment. If a procedure exposes "a particular
imported product to a risk of discrimination [it] constitutes, by itself, a
form of discrimination. ' 3
14
This issue was addressed directly in the recent Dispute Panel deci-
sion in United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.315 The Eu-
ropean Economic Community challenged the United States's
administrative decisionmaking process under section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930316 as violative of article III.317 Section 337 declares unlawful
unfair competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles, where
the effect is to destroy or injure a domestic industry, "prevent the estab-
lishment of such an industry," or "restrain or monopolize trade and
commerce in the United States. '3 18 The European Community argued
that section 337 violated article III because an alleged domestic patent
infringer was subject only to traditional federal district court proceed-
ings, while action against an alleged foreign patent infringer also could be
taken under the special administrative procedures of the United States
International Trade Commission ([JSITC).319 The Panel agreed with the
312 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doe. L/6439 (1989),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 385-86 para. 5.10 (36th Supp. 1990).
313 Id. (quoting Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, GATT
Doc. L/833 (1958), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 60, 64 para. 12 (7th Supp. 1959)). The
Dispute Panel carefully noted that the focus is not on whether the laws actually result in
discriminatory treatment, but whether the laws are capable of according less favorable treat-
ment to imported products. Id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 386-87 para. 5.12-.13
(36th Supp. 1990). This approach allows a contracting party to use GATT as a means to
prevent discriminatory treatment, not simply to rectify it. Id., reprinted in BISD, supra note
1, at 345, 387 para. 5.13 (36th Supp. 1990).
314 EEC-Payments and Subsidies, GATT Doe. L/6627 para. 141 (1989) (emphasis in orig-
inal) (on file at New York University Law Review); see also 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at
190 (testimony of Noel Hemmendinger, Counsel, Willkie Farr & Gallagher) (risks of importa-
tion include litigation).
315 GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 385-86 (36th Supp.
1990).
316 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
317 United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doe. L/6439 (1989), re-
printed in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 354 para. 3.12 (36th Supp. 1990).
318 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1). This provision is employed frequently to challenge foreign in-
fringements of valid United States patents. See Office of the United States Trade Rep., Execu-
tive Office of the President, Possible Amendments to Procedures for Enforcement of Patent
Rights 3 (Jan. 1990) (on file at New York University Law Review).
319 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989),
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European Community's interpretation and found the procedures to be
violative of article 111.320
Two aspects of this decision are particularly relevant to a private
right of action against dumping. First, the Panel found the possibility of
proceedings in two forums to be discriminatory against foreign im-
ports. 321 It stated, "[W]hile the likelihood of having to defend... in two
fora is small, the existence of the possibility is inherently less favourable
than being faced with having to conduct a defence in only one of those
fora.' ' 322 Second, the Panel found that the availability of a forum in
which to challenge imported products that is not available to those chal-
lenging products of American origin accords imported products less
favorable treatment than their domestic counterparts.
323
These principles show that the proposed bills would discriminate
against imported products and thus would violate article III. First, less
favorable treatment is accorded to imported products when petitioners
are allowed to seek monetary damages in federal district court or file a
complaint with the Department of Commerce for the imposition of an
antidumping duty against the dumper.324 In contrast, a complainant
claiming domestic price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act
is limited to bringing the action in federal court, with the Federal Trade
Commission being the tribunal of first instance.325 Providing complain-
ants with a choice of forums against a foreign dumper with no corre-
sponding choice against domestic producers is less favorable treatment in
violation of article 111.326
A crucial implication of the choice of forum disparity is that a for-
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 357-58 para. 3.11 (36th Supp. 1990).
320 The Panel relied on the following factors in reaching its conclusion: parties challenging
imported products were given a choice of forum, while parties challenging domestic products
were not given this choice; foreign importers were given more stringent time limits than do-
mestic producers; only foreign importers were denied the ability to counterclaim; while a gen-
eral exclusion order is available in United States International Trade Commission proceedings
against imports, no such remedy is available in federal court; exclusion orders are enforced
automatically; and foreign importers may be defendants in proceedings before the USITC and
in federal district court. Id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 391 para. 5.20 (36th
Supp. 1990).
321 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 390 para. 5.19 (36th Supp. 1990).
322 Id.
323 See id.
324 See S. 2408, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § (d), 132 Cong. Rec. S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986)
(petitioner may elect to allow imposition of duties or preserve right to seek damages from
foreign producers); text accompanying notes 161-62 supra (discussing possible remedies).
325 See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 745 (1947) (Federal Trade
Commission is appropriate tribunal to first hear issues under Robinson-Patman Price Discrim-
ination Act); First Nat'l Bank, v. Jones, 48 Ill. 2d 282, 289, 269 N.E.2d 494, 498 (1971) (fed-
eral courts are only available forums for recovery under Robinson-Patman).
326 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 389 para. 5.18 (36th Supp. 1990).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 1991]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
eign dumper may be required to defend itself in two simultaneous pro-
ceedings.327 Since the private right of action against dumping does not
displace the existing remedy of an antidumping duty,328 a complainant
could bring an action in federal court seeking monetary and equitable
relief while also filing a complaint before the Department of Commerce
requesting the assessment of an antidumping duty.329 Such an option is
not available to parties challenging domestic producers. As the Dispute
Panel in United States-Section 337 found, the possibility that importers
of challenged products may have to defend themselves both before the
USITC and in federal district court while no such corresponding expo-
sure exists with respect to products of domestic origin, accords less
favorable treatment to imported products as opposed to like products of
American origin.
330
Plaintiffs challenging imported products also would have an eviden-
tiary advantage that is not available to be used against domestic produ-
cers.331 Such plaintiffs would be able to use a final administrative
determination that dumping and/or domestic injury had occurred as
prima facie evidence in a concurrent or subsequent private civil action,
332
while plaintiffs challenging domestic producers lack this evidentiary ad-
vantage because separate administrative hearings on domestic price dis-
crimination do not exist.
Finally, problems of discriminatory enforcement exist. An interna-
tional Robinson-Patman analogue may be enforced more vigorously be-
cause antidumping laws are enforced more aggressively than the
Robinson-Patman Act.333 Thus, de facto discrimination would result.
334
327 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 390 (36th Supp. 1990).
328 See 135 Cong. Rec. Si 19 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (S.179 would not displace any existing
remedies); 133 Cong. Rec. S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987) (S.361 would not displace any ex-
isting remedies through International Trade Commission). For a description of exisiting an-
tidumping remedies, see text accompanying notes 96-109 supra.
329 For a discussion of this latter procedure, see text accompanying notes 100-09 supra.
330 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doe. L/6439 (1989),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 391 para. 5.20 (36th Supp. 1990).
331 See 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 831-32 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA S.
1655); 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 164 (same).
332 See S. 1204, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 131(d) (1989); S. 179, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § l(b),
135 Cong. Rec. S120 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); S. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b), 133 Cong.
Rec. S8393 (daily ed. June 19, 1987); S. 361, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a), 133 Cong. Rec.
S1066 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987); S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a); 1987 Hearings, supra note
21, at 932 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S. 1655); 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at
164 (same).
333 See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 28 (testimony of Alan F. Holmer, General Counsel,
Office of the United States Trade Representative).
334 De facto discrimination occurs when a regulation is not facially discriminatory but has
the effect of favoring domestic over imported products. See J. Jackson, World Trading Sys-
tem, supra note 2, at 192, 388 n.100; J. Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 4, at 496. Under
article III, neither "facial" nor "as applied" forms of discrimination are permitted against
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Although it is difficult to speculate on the nature of future enforcement
procedures because of the relatively few Robinson-Patman actions335 as
compared to the numerous antidumping actions,336 substantial likelihood
of a "double standard" does exist.
Thus, even if the substantive aspects of a private right of action
against dumping paralleled existing domestic legislation, a law that cre-
ated a private right of action would violate GATT if it had the effect of
affording protection to domestic products.337 Because a private right of
action offers a choice of forums, double proceedings, evidentiary advan-
tages, and unequal enforcement procedures, 338 it violates article III by
being procedurally discriminatory against imported products.3 39 Thus, a
private right of action against dumping would be inconsistent with arti-
cles III and XI and would not be protected under the Protocol. The
general exception provision of article XX(d) is the only remaining possi-
ble means for rescuing the antidumping private right of action.
E. Article XX(d) as a General Exception
Article XX(d) is a general exception to GATIr340 that allows a con-
imported products. The clearest example of de facto discrimination is where the substantive
laws of a contracting party do not violate article III but are administered in a way that accords
less favorable treatment to imported products. See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989) (there may be cases where application of formally
identical legal provisions in practice would accord less favorable treatment to imported prod-
ucts), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 386 para. 5.11 (36th Supp. 1990).
335 See Calvani, Government Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 53 Antitrust L.J.
921, 926-27 (1985) (noting that approximately two cases per year were brought during first
Reagan Administration and that this record is not very different from enforcement efforts of
past administrations).
336 From 1980 to 1986, 658 antidumping and countervailing duty petitions (averaging 94
per year) were filed. See 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 652 (testimony of Gilbert B. Kaplan,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, Department of Commerce). From
1980 to 1985, 282 antidumping investigations were initiated (averaging 47 per year) and only
17 of the investigations, or six percent, resulted in final determinations favoring the foreign
importer. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 37 (testimony of Gilbert B. Kaplan, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, Department of Commerce).
337 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 193.
338 See EEC-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseed, GATT
Doc. L/6627 para. 5.12 (regulation capable of being discriminatory is inconsistent with article
III) (on file at New York University Law Review); United States-Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, GATI Doc. L/6439 (focus is on whether provision may lead to less favorable
treatment), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 387 para. 5.13 (36th Supp. 1990).
339 A private right of action that avoided these problems currently can not be constructed
because of a critical procedural problem: the discriminatory disadvantage of a choice of fo-
rums remains. Given that the primary mechanism for initiating an antidumping proceeding is
private petitioning, see text accompanying notes 102-03 supra, Congress has two alternatives.
First, it could alter the initiation process of the antidumping determinations more drastically
or, second, it could give private parties a choice to petition for a dumping duty or to seek
equitable or monetary relief in a private proceeding.
340 J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 744. Parties seeking protection under a
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tracting party to use measures that normally would violate some provi-
sion of GATT if the measures are necessary to secure compliance with
domestic laws or with regulations that are not otherwise inconsistent
with the General Agreement.3 41 To invoke article XX(d) successfully, a
contracting party must show that: (1) the laws or regulations with which
compliance is being secured are themselves consistent with GATT;3 42 (2)
the measures are necessary to secure compliance with those laws or regu-
lations; 34 3 and (3) the measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" 3 " or a
"disguised restriction on international trade. '3 45 For example, under
GATT exception have the burden of proving that they have met all the conditions of the
exception. See Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, GATT Doc. L/6568
(1989), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 68, 84-85 para. 59 (36th Supp. 1990); Canada-
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504 (1984), reprinted
in BISD, supra note 1, at 140, 164 para. 5.20 (30th Supp. 1984).
341 Article XX(d) states:
[Provided] such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this [General] Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement... of measures... (d)
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement ....
GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d).
342 See, e.g., United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439
(1989) (substantive patent laws with which § 337 secures compliance in conformity with
GATT), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 392 para. 5.24 (36th Supp. 1990); Japan-
Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, GATT Doc. L/6253 (1988) (sub-
stantive laws protecting operation of monopolies violate GATT and preclude invocation of
article XX(d)), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 163, 230 para. 5.2.2.3 (35th Supp. 1989);
United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GA IT Doc. L/5333
(1983) (substantive patent laws of United States not inconsistent with GATT; invocation of
article XX(d) allowed), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125-26 paras. 57, 61 (30th
Supp. 1984).
343 See, e.g., United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439
(1989) (in rem orders may be "necessary" under article XX(d)), reprinted in BISD, supra note
1, at 345, 392-93 para. 5.26 (36th Supp. 1990); Canada-Administration of Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504 (1984) (investment purchase undertakings not "neces-
sary" for effective administration of Foreign Investment Review Act; invocation of article
XX(d) not allowed), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 140, 164-65 para. 5.20 (30th Supp.
1984); United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doc. L/5333
(1983) (exclusion order necessary where no satisfactory and effective alternative exists that
would provide sufficiently effective remedy), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125-26
paras. 58-60 (30th Supp. 1984).
.344 GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d); see, e.g., United States-Imports of Certain Automo-
tive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doc. L/5333 (1983) (discrimination of Canada not arbitrary or
unjustifiable where exclusion is directed against imports from all foreign sources), reprinted in
BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125 para. 55 (30th Supp. 1984); United States-Prohibition of
Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products From Canada, GATT Doe. L/5198 (1982) (discrimina-
tion of Canada not arbitrary or unjustifiable where similar action had been taken against four
other countries), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 91, 108 para. 4.8 (29th Supp. 1983).
345 GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d); see, e.g., United States-Imports of Certain Automo-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:696
ANTIDUMPING LAWS
this exception, a general exclusion of a product that infringes a domestic
patent is permissible because the exclusion is necessary to secure compli-
ance with the contracting party's patent laws. 346 This exclusion is per-
missible if the substantive patent law of the contracting party complies
with GATT,3 47 even though the general exclusion order arguably vio-
lates article XI.348 The general exclusion procedure is allowed as a
means of securing compliance with the patent laws.3 49
For a private right of action against dumping to be permissible
under article XX(d), therefore, the laws with which compliance is sought
themselves must be consistent with GATT. This requirement would ap-
ply to all of the substantive provisions of any new private right of ac-
tion.350 However, the substantive aspects of the proposed private right of
action raise grave concerns of inconsistency with GATr.351 If the dis-
crepancies between the laws governing domestic products and the pro-
posals affecting foreign products are not reconciled, any recourse to
article XX(d) would be unjustified.
35 2
Nevertheless, assuming that a private right of action against dump-
ing parallels a domestic remedy such as the Robinson-Patman Act,
whether the measures that would be invoked for protection under article
XX(d) are "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or are a "disguised
restriction on international trade" still must be determined. 353 The term
"measures," as it is used in article XX, has been interpreted quite
broadly to include enforcement mechanisms, 354 administrative proce-
tive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doc. L/5333 (1984) (exclusion measure not disguised restric-
tion on trade where published in Federal Register, enforced at border, and entry permitted
with patent holder's license), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125 para. 56 (30th Supp.
1984); United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products From Canada,
GATT Doe. L/5198 (1982) (measure not disguised restriction on trade where action taken as
trade measure and publicly announced as such), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 91, 108
para. 4.8 (29th Supp. 1983).
346 See United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doc. L/
5333 (1983), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 124-26 paras. 49-60 (30th Supp. 1984).
But see United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989)
(certain procedures enforcing patent laws not justified under article XX(d)), reprinted in
BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 393-96 paras. 5.28-.35 (36th Supp. 1990).
347 See United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doc. L/
5333 (1983), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125 para. 57 (30th Supp. 1984).
348 See text accompanying notes 264-77 supra.
349 See id.
350 See text accompanying notes 148-57 supra.
351 See text accompanying notes 285-311 supra.
352 See Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, GAIT Doc. L/
6253 (1988), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 163, 230 para. 5.2.2.3 (35th Supp. 1989).
353 GATT, supra note 1, art. XX.
354 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GAT Doc. L/6439 (1989)
(general exclusion orders are "necessary" measures), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345,
394-95 paras. 5.30-.32 (36th Supp. 1990); United States-Imports of Certain Automotive
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dures, 355 and other such practices. 356 Therefore, many aspects of the
proposed remedy would constitute "measures" within the meaning of ar-
ticle XX, including direct access to federal court; procedures allowing for
choice of forums; double proceedings; and other enforcement mecha-
nisms such as injunctions or exclusion orders.
The historical treatment of the "disguised restriction" requirement
indicates that a private right of action would pass this criterion success-
fully. This requirement does not inquire whether the measure itself is a
disguised restriction, but rather whether the application of the measure
would be a disguised restriction on trade.357 Thus, those Dispute Panels
that have commented on this requirement have focused on whether the
measure is a trade measure,358 whether the measure is published in gov-
ernment documents, 359 or whether the measure is subject to procedural
safeguards. 360 Under these standards, the proposed private right of ac-
tion against dumping hardly would be a veiled restriction. The action
has been proclaimed as a trade measure universally. It would be subject
to the normal procedural safeguards in federal courts and in the USITC.
And the results of any such proceedings would be published in govern-
ment documents. In short, there is no persuasive argument that a private
right of action would be a disguised restriction on trade.
Whether such a measure would be a means of "arbitrary or unjusti-
fied discrimination" still needs to be considered. Those Dispute Panels
faced with this issue have tended to inquire into whether the relevant
Spring Assemblies, GATT Doe. L/5333 (1983), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 126
para. 60 (30th Supp. 1984).
355 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (service
of process measure), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 394 para. 5.30 (36th Supp.
1990)); Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504
(1984) (investment purchase undertakings and review of investment proposals measures), re-
printed in BISD, supra note 1, at 140, 164-65 para. 5.20 (30th Supp. 1984).
356 See EEC-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, GAT Doe. L/6657 para.
5.12 (1990) (anticircumvention duty measure) (on file at New York University Law Review);
United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989) (automatic
enforcement practice is "necessary" measure; presidential review of administrative determina-
tion is "necessary" measure), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 393, 395 paras. 5.29,
5.33 (36th Supp. 1990); Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products,
GATT Doe. L/6253 (private import restrictions measures), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1,
at 163, 230 para. 5.2.2.3 (35th Supp. 1989).
357 See United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doc. L/
5333 (1983), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125 para. 56 (30th Supp. 1984).
358 See United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products From Canada,
GAT Doc. L/5198 (1982), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 91, 108 para. 4.8 (29th Supp.
1983).
359 See United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GAT Doc. L/
5333 (1983), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125 para. 56 (30th Supp. 1984).
360 See id. (before exclusion order could issue, both validity of patent and its infringement
by foreign manufacturer had to be established).
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trade restrictions have been applied against all offending countries uni-
formly. Thus, an exclusion order against Canadian products that in-
fringe upon a valid United States patent is not arbitrary or unjustified if
the order is directed at products from all other foreign sources that in-
fringe valid patents as well. 361 Likewise, a United States prohibition on
Canadian tuna products is not evidence of arbitrary or unjustified dis-
crimination when a similar action is taken against like imports from
other countries.
362
It is uncertain whether the proposed private right of action against
dumping would be applied arbitrarily. Domestic competitors using any
powers vested in them may abuse their positions to gain an unfair com-
petitive advantage. Allowing direct access to federal courts could occa-
sion frivolous lawsuits and unnecessarily burden defendants with
unmeritorious cases. 363 Likewise, a plaintiff could use the option of si-
multaneous proceedings as a calculated strategy to burden its most de-
spised competitors with costly litigation. These measures also could be
used to discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably against certain foreign
competitors. Therefore, to avoid or to reduce the potential for abuse,
some governmental screening or certification procedures may be needed
to prevent arbitrary or unjustified actions.364 Without this prophylactic,
direct access to federal courts and the option of double proceedings may
constitute arbitrary and unjustified measures that would preclude protec-
tion under article XX.
Although arguably in violation of articles III and XI, injunctive re-
lief, for purposes of article XX(d), would fall into the category of general
exclusions defined by the Dispute Panel. 365 Therefore, an injunction
would not be an arbitrary or unjustified measure as long as similar in-
junctions are issued against other offending parties.
Assuming, then, that a private right of action would satisfy these
elements of the article XX(d) test, it also must meet the "necessary to
secure compliance" element. 366 Under that criterion, a measure is con-
361 See id., reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125 para. 55 (30th Supp. 1984).
362 See United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada,
GATT Doe. L/5198 (1982), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 91, 108 para. 4.8 (29th Supp.
1983).
363 See 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 185 (statement of Rep. Guarini).
364 Rep. Guarini has proposed a bill that prevents a private right of action from being pur-
sued until an antidumping order has been obtained as evidence that dumping laws have been
violated. See H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 138 (1986); 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at
185 (statement of Rep. Guarini).
365 See notes 354-55 supra.
366 This element is arguably the most important. Both Dispute Panel reports that have
extensively addressed article XX(d) have devoted an inordinate amount of time to the neces-
sity defense. See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. /6439
(1989), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 392-95 paras. 5.25-.35 (36th Supp. 1990);
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sidered to be unnecessary when a satisfactory alternative remedy ex-
ists. 367  By this formulation, the GATT Dispute Panel envisions an
approach using "least trade-restrictive" alternatives. 368 Given a choice
between competing measures, a contracting party is obligated first to se-
lect that measure that is consistent with GATT; if no such measure ex-
ists, the contracting party is bound to select the measure that "entails the
least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.
369
The practices of other contracting parties may be examined to deter-
mine if a procedure is "necessary" under article XX(d). 370 If this exami-
nation is done, it becomes apparent that a scheme which would provide
direct access to federal court and to monetary damages cannot be consid-
ered "necessary" under article XX(d). No other contracting party cur-
rently provides this type of remedy. 371 Instead, other countries continue
to rely on traditional antidumping duty orders to protect their domestic
industries. 372 Moreover, this alternative scheme is not "necessary" since
another relatively effective and less trade-restrictive means of enforcing
American antidumping laws already exists-namely, the existing system
United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doe. L/5333
(1983), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125-26 paras. 58-60 (30th Supp. 1984).
367 See United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doc. L/
5333 (1983), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125-26 para. 58 (30th Supp. 1984).
368 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989)
(contracting party bound to use, among measures reasonably available to it, that which entails
least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at
345, 392 para. 5.26 (36th Supp. 1990).
369 Id. Unfortunately, the Dispute Panel did not discuss what a contracting party should do
when the competing alternatives are not equally effective. For example, the question is open as
to whether measure A, which is substantially less effective but more consistent with GATT,
must be chosen over measure B, which is more effective but less consistent with GATT. Stated
differently, when could a contracting party "reasonably be expected to employ" a more consis-
tent alternative? The logical conclusion would be to first have an "effectiveness threshold."
See id. ("[I]f a contracting party could reasonably secure that level of enforcement in a manner
that is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions, it would be required to do so."). Once
this is achieved, the contracting party is obligated to select among those measures considered
"effective" the measure that is most consistent or, barring that, the least violative alternative.
370 See id. (United States patent enforcement scheme under § 337 not necessary, since many
countries have no separate import enforcement scheme but instead grant their civil courts
jurisdiction over imported products), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 393 para. 5.28
(36th Supp. 1990).
371 See 1983 Hearing, supra note 21, at 51 (testimony of Joel Davidow, Partner, Mudge
Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon) (no other country punishes dumping with damages). But
see Steele, supra note 232, at 274-76 (recent amendments to Australian Trade Practices Act
may provide private law remedy to individual parties in antidumping cases where anticompeti-
tive or predatory purposes exist).
372 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989)
(section 337 scheme not necessary since many countries grant their civil courts jurisdiction
over foreign patent infringers), reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 393 para. 5.28 (36th
Supp. 1990).
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of levying a duty equal to the margin of dumping.373 Likewise, simulta-
neous proceedings are not necessary to secure compliance with the an-
tidumping laws given that all other contracting parties provide for only
one avenue of relief.
3 74
For similar reasons, private injunctive relief in the form of a general
exclusion order against dumping is not "necessary" under article XX(d).
While it is true that the Dispute Panel has found certain in rem and
general exclusion orders necessary within article XX(d)'s exception,
375
those disputes involved patent infringement claims and can be distin-
guished from sanctions against dumped imports. With dumping, the de-
fect in the product is generally its price, coupled with an injury to a
domestic industry.3 76 In contrast, the defect in merchandise that in-
fringes a patent is connected intrinsically to the very substance of the
article itself.3 77 The defect in a product that infringes a patent cannot be
cured without changing the physical characteristics of the product, while
the defect in a dumped product can be cured easily by raising the
price.3 7 9 Therefore, means other than injunctions or exclusion orders
can remedy the importation of a dumped product effectively. One obvi-
ous remedy is a duty to offset the price difference. Another is monetary
damages to compensate for any injury sustained. As a last resort, an
injunction against only those products imported at less than fair market
value could be issued if damages were inadequate. 379 A general exclusion
order against products may not be needed, and, even if needed, other
effective alternatives that are more consistent with GATT exist.
38 0
In a similar manner, it is difficult to show that a "discovery injunc-
373 See text accompanying notes 96-108 supra.
374 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 393 para. 5.28 (36th Supp. 1990); 1983 Hearing, supra
note 21, at 51 (testimony of Joel Davidow, Partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander &
Ferdon).
375 See United States--Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 (1989)
reprinted in BISD, supra note 1, at 345, 394 para. 5.31-.32 (36th Supp. 1990); United States-
Importing Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doe. L/5333 (1983), reprinted in
BISD, supra note 1, at 107, 125-26 paras. 58-60 (30th Supp. 1984).
376 See 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 933 (Report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S.
1655) (nothing intrinsically unlawful about importation of particular product at below market
price; alleged dumper can cure conduct instantaneously by raising United States price or low-
ering home price); 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 166 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on
S. 1655) (same).
377 See 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 933 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S.
1655) (sale of product carrying false trademark designation intrinsically unlawful); 1986 Hear-
ing, supra note 12, at 166 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S. 1655) (same).
378 See 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 933 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S.
1655); 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 166 (same).
379 See 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 934 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S.
1655).
380 See text accompanying notes 368-69 supra.
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tion"381 is "necessary" given that other satisfactory and less trade restric-
tive alternatives exist. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide
ample means to enforce discovery obligations. 382 These sanctions can be
used against foreign parties, 38 3 and there is no valid reason to conclude
that an antidumping case cannot be litigated effectively with the same
rules of procedure.
384
Although article XX(d) appears at first to be an effective means of
curing GATT infirmities, it ultimately is unavailable. It therefore fails to
protect the measures that would be deployed in the proposed bills. Even
if the substantive law would be consistent with GATT, the measures
could lead to arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. Moreover, they
would not be necessary to secure compliance with the antidumping laws.
In short, the proposed private right of action fails to clear the article
XX(d) hurdle as well.
CONCLUSION
In its attempt to find a panacea to cure the ills of United States
antidumping laws, several congressional measures have been proposed to
respond to the current international economic environment. One such
proposal is a private right of action against foreign dumping. Although
initially attractive, such a remedy would not be faithful to our interna-
tional obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Any attempt to clothe such proposals with the protective garment of
"preexisting legislation" of GATT's Provisional Protocol would be in
vain. As proposed, a private right of action with injunctive relief clearly
would violate article XI's restriction on import prohibitions. It would
not ensure that imported products are treated as favorably as domestic
products under article III. And even if the substantive laws of the pro-
posed private right of action could be drafted to parallel the Robinson-
Patman Act, the procedural discrimination that would result from dispa-
rate administrative mechanisms would violate article III. Finally, the
proposed private right of action would not fall within the general excep-
tion of article XX(d).
Given that all the proposed private rights of action would be in vio-
381 See text accompanying note 162 supra.
382 Available court sanctions include: refusal to allow claims or defenses; stay, dismissal, or
rendering of default judgment; contempt orders; and payment of reasonable expenses caused
by failure to comply. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
383 See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 709 (1982) (imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2) against foreign defendants for
failure to provide necessary information to determine personal jurisdiction upheld).
384 See 1987 Hearings, supra note 21, at 934 n.9 (report of Antitrust Section of ABA on S.
1655); 1986 Hearing, supra note 12, at 166 n.9 (same).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:696
ANTIDUMPING LAWS
lation of the General Agreement, the issue of alleviating the problems
that exist in the United States's current antidumping scheme remains. If
a private right of action is not consistent with GATT, are there "less
trade-restrictive" alternatives that could deter dumping or compensate
domestic industries injured by dumping?
One approach would question the basic premises underlying the an-
tidumping laws.3 85 Under this approach, many of the so-called
"problems" with existing antidumping laws evidence a concern not for
promoting competition, but for protecting competitive advantage. Thus,
it could be argued that the proper operation of international free markets
encourages antidumping laws to play a limited role to curb anticompeti-
tive behavior.3 86 By questioning antidumping laws generally, this ap-
proach also fundamentally challenges the assertion that there are
"problems" with the current scheme that require strengthening of our
antidumping laws.
But assuming the soundness of the underlying policies, the best way
to respond to the current inadequacies in United States dumping laws is
through multilateral negotiations. To address the case of massive im-
ports of dumped goods over a short period of time, the Antidumping
Code could be modified to permit a quicker imposition of provisional
duties.38 7 The contracting parties also could modify the current limited
right of retroactive relief,3 s8 allowing for the imposition of retroactive
remedies to the point at which an antidumping violation first oc-
curred.38 9 More controversially, special provisions, imposing a "penalty
duty" in addition to a duty equal to the margin of dumping, could be
established to guard against particularly egregious forms of recidivist or
385 See text accompanying notes 65-81 supra.
386 See, e.g., Antidumping Laws Should be Replaced by Competition Law, Canadian Law-
yer Says, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 729, 729 (May 23, 1990) (antidumping law counterproduc-
tive in market economy); Substantial Reform of GATT Antidumping Code Seen Difficult To
Achieve in Uruguay Round, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 397, 399 (Mar. 21, 1990) (lack of compe-
tition policy rules in GAT is loophole in current system). See generally P. Nicolaides, The
Competition Effects of Dumping, 24 J. World Trade 115 (1990) (arguing that use of antidump-
ing mechanisms often is anticompetitive).
387 See Canadian GAT Antidumping Code Proposals Include Public Interest Over-Ride
Provision, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 17, 17 (Jan. 3, 1990) (Canadian government argues for
provision for public interest override of dumping rules). At the Uruguay Round, Canada in-
cluded this recommendation as part of its proposed revisions of the Antidumping Code. See
id.
388 See note 140 supra.
389 See Fourth Annual Judicial Conference, 112 F.R.D. 439, 546 (1986) (statement of
Charlene Barshefsky, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson). Currently, the Antidumping Code of 1979
permits retroactive relief for up to 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional meas-
ures and not the first discovery date of a dumping violation. See Antidumping Code of 1979,
supra note 90, art. 11.
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predatory dumping.39 0
Unilaterally, the United States could take, and has taken, several
steps to reduce its current problems while remaining faithful to its inter-
national obligations under GATT. The most promising of these steps
would be the implementation of a program of "undertakings" in which
foreign exporters would undertake to revise prices to eliminate the dump-
ing margin, the injury, or, more drastically, to cease exports.3 91 Under-
takings have been used by the European Community from the outset,
and a high proportion of European Community antidumping cases are
concluded by undertakings.3 92 Secondly, the United States could amend
its laws to designate that monies received from the imposition of a final
affirmative duty order be deposited into a "special compensation ac-
count" payable to the injured parties who successfully pursue adminis-
trative actions against a foreign manufacturer. 393 Thirdly, Congress
could pass legislation permitting injured domestic industries to submit
remuneration claims to the federal government for any injury received as
a result of foreign dumping.3 94 Finally, recent legislation passed as part
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988395 may have en-
hanced the deterrent effect of United States antidumping laws,3 96 thus
390 This option was proposed by some delegates during the original drafting of the an-
tidumping provisions. See Preparatory Comm. of the International Conference on Trade and
Employment, Technical Sub-Comm. at 12, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54 (1946) (punitive an-
tidumping duties should be allowed m case of aggravated or sporadic dumping); Drafting
Comm. of the Preparatory Comm. of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment, Draft Report of the Technical Sub-Comm. at 18, U.N. Doe. E/PC/T/C.6/55 (1947)
(same); J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 2, at 405 (same). Similarly, other delegates felt a
duty could exceed the margin of dumping in certain instances. See Preparatory Comm. of the
International Conference on Trade and Employment, Technical Sub-Comm. at 13, U.N. Doe.
E/PC/T/C.II/54 (1946) (proposing antidumping duty be "at least the rate of" margin of
dumping). Presumably, the proceeds of a punitive remedy could compensate the injured do-
mestic industry.
A punitive approach to antidumping duties, however, arguably would misconstrue the
nature of antidumping rules and the ambiguously "wrongful" nature of dumping. See J. Jack-
son, World Trading System, supra note 2, at 243. It also would require modifying article VI or
it too would violate GATT's limitation on a "duty not greater in amount than the margin of
dumping." GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 2.
391 See Bellis, supra note 232, at 52.
392 See id.
393 A few of the proposed bills have included this "special compensation account" provi-
sion. See S. 2408, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. S5330 (daily ed. May 6, 1986); H.R.
4508, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. E902 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1986); H.R. Rep. No. 40,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 166-167, 133 Cong. Rec. H2642 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (amending
H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)).
394 See Steele, supra note 232, at 277 (discussing Australian assistance applications program
for industries structurally damaged by dumping).
395 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2901 (1980 &
Supp. 1991)).
396 Changes as a result of this Act include the strengthening of the "critical circumstances"
provisions of United States antidumping laws, 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e)(1) (1988), the addition of
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partially reducing the need for further legislation.
In sum, any action taken by the United States to strengthen an-
tidumping laws should be done with a view toward careful compliance
with GATT. Careful compliance with GATT, however, is not the con-
clusion one draws from a prudential analysis of a private right of action
against dumping.
new "short life cycle" provisions, id. § 1673h, and "anticircumvention" laws. Id. § 1677j. For
a summary of these changes, see T. Vakerics, D. Wilson, K. Weigel, supra note 105, at 21-36.
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397 See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
398 See note 151 and accompanying text supra.
399 See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
4o See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
401 Court has discretion to assess additional punitive damages.
402 See notes 154-55 and accompanying text supra.
403 See notes 156-57 and accompanying text supra.
404 See notes 159-60, 310 and accompanying text supra.
405 See note 159 supra; note 309 and accompanying text supra.
406 See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
407 See note 161 and accompanying text supra.
40s See note 162 and accompanying text supra.
409 See note 311 and accompanying text supra.
410 See notes 163-65 and accompanying text supra.
411 See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
412 Is more of a "GATT Savings" clause. See note 166 supra.
413 See note 393 and accompanying text supra.
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414 Court has discretion to assess additional punitive damages.
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